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SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
THE WORK OF THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE
By PAUL G.

DEMBLINGt AND DANIEL M.

ARONStt

I. INTRODUCTION

T IS THE purpose of this article to discuss the manner in which the
United Nations has treated the matter of international regulation of
the uses of outer space. Attention will be focused particularly on the recent consideration given by the Legal Subcommittee of the General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the subjects of
assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles and of liability
for damage caused by space vehicles.
Although prior to 19 58 certain international organizations affiliated with
the United Nations were concerned with some aspects of the peaceful
uses of outer space,' it was not until that year that the United Nations
itself focused on the problems of outer space. On 13 December 1958, the
General Assembly passed Resolution 1348 (XIII) which established an
Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. One of the purposes of the Committee was to explore "the nature of legal problems which
may arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space."
The Ad Hoc Committee met for the first time on 6 May 1959. It established a Legal Subcommittee which held five formal meetings and adopted
a report which became part of the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee
approved on 25 June 1959.2
Much of the discussion in the Legal Subcommittee concerned the identification of legal problems which came within its jurisdiction. There was
general agreement that it was not possible to identify all of the legal
problems regarding the peaceful uses of outer space, but that some of the
t Deputy General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A.B., M.A., Rutgers
University; J.D., The George Washington University. Member of the bar of the District of Columbia and Supreme Court of the United States. [Mr. Dembling was a member of the United
States delegation to the Legal Subcommittee during its Third and Fourth Sessions.]
tt Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., Georgetown University. Member of the
bar of the District of Columbia.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the writers and are not intended as
expressions of any agency or organization with which they may be connected.
' Primarily these were the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO); the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
'U.N. Doc. No. A/4141, at 61-70 (1959).
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problems were susceptible of priority treatment. Six such problems were
listed in the report:'
(1) The extent to which there was established a general rule, through
the practice of States in the satellite programs of the International Geophysical Year, that within the context of strictly peaceful uses "outer space
is freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing or future international law or agreements;"
(2) "The problem of liability for injury or damage caused by space
vehicles;"
(3) "The problem of allocation of radio frequencies to space vehicles;"
(4) "The avoidance of interference between space vehicles and aircraft;"
(5) "The identification and registration of space vehicles and the coordination of launchings;" and
(6) The problems associated with the re-entry and landing of space
vehicles.
One year after establishing the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly created the present Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.' The
Committee consisted of twenty-four designated members who were to
serve for the years 1960-1961. The mandate of this Committee, like its
predecessor, included the obligation "to study the nature of legal problems
which may arise from the exploration of outer space." The Committee
met on 27 November 1961." The meeting and the later agreement on a
draft resolution originally proposed by the United States led to the
adoption by the General Assembly on 20 December 1961, of Resolution
1721 (XVI) which, inter alia, commended to States "for their guidance
in the exploration and use of outer space" the following principles:
(1) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
(2) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.
Thus, for the first time, certain general legal principles' governing the
exploration and use of outer space received the formal imprint of a General Assembly Resolution.
The Resolution also invited the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space "to study and report on the legal problems
'Address by Eilene Galloway, The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space Accomplishments and Implications for Legal Problems, in SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON
(Second Space Law Colloquium, 10th Cong., International
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 30-41 (1960)
Astronautical Federation, 4 Sept. 1959.)
4U.N. GEN. Ass. RES. 1472 (XIV), 12 Dec. 1959.
'The delay in assembling was occasioned by a dispute concerning membership, the distribution
of Committee offices, and voting procedures-the U.S.S.R. insisting that decisions be made by
unanimous rather than majority vote. The United States and other nations desired that decisions
be made by a majority or two-thirds vote, consistent with the rules of the General Assembly.
' It should be noted that these general principles were commended to States for their guidance.
Much of the debate in the Legal Subcommittee during the 1962-1963 Sessions concerned the
merits of recommending draft treaties, which would become obligatory on the signatories, or recommending General Assembly resolutions providing only guiding principles which, at most, would
provide evidence of the custom and practice generally acceptable to the international community.
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which may arise from the exploration and use of outer space." The Committee was requested to meet not later than 31 March 1962 to carry out
its mandate as expressed in the Resolution.
The Committee held eight meetings in New York in March 1962. The
differences between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics [hereinafter U.S.S.R.] over voting were resolved by an agreement to the effect that the Committee, and its subcommittees, would conduct their activities and reach agreement without voting.7 The Chairman
would merely express the consensus of views where a consensus could be
formed, and the reports would reflect the various opinions expressed to
the extent that they differed. It was also agreed that in implementing the
Committee's function to promote international cooperation in space activities, the programs of the relevant United Nations specialized agencies and
nongovernmental organizations would be coordinated but not duplicated.
To aid in this coordination, observers from UNESCO, WMO, ITU, and
COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) were invited to participate in
the deliberations of the Committee.
The Committee also established two subcommittees: a Legal Subcommittee and a Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. Since 1962 the Legal
Subcommittee has held four formal sessions. The remainder of this article
will be concerned specifically with the meetings comprising those sessions.
Inasmuch as greater consideration was given to the topics of "assistance
and return" and "liability" in the last two sessions of the Subcommittee,
these will be discussed in depth, while the first two sessions will be treated
in summary fashion.

II.

FIRST SESSION OF LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

The Subcommittee held its first session between 28 May and 30 June
1962, at Geneva, Switzerland, with the representatives of twenty-seven
States taking part in the discussions! At that meeting, the United States
and the U.S.S.R. each introduced two proposals. The United States proposals dealt with the subjects of assistance to and return of personnel and
space vehicles' [hereinafter "assistance and return"] and liability for
space vehicle accidents" [hereinafter "liability"]. One of the Soviet proposals was entitled ProposedDeclaration of Basic Principles Governing the
Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space." It contained nine points, four of which involved questions of a
controversial political nature, and was strongly opposed by the United
'Statement

by the Chairman, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/PV.2 (1962).
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Rumania,
Sierra Leone, Sweden, United Arab Republic, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States.
Chad was absent.
'U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.3 (1962).
10U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1o5/C.2/L.4
(1962). This was a proposed request from the Subcommittee to the Secretary General to constitute a small advisory panel of experts to study the
subject of liability in accordance with certain Subcommittee guidelines.
"U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.1 (1962).
8
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States and a number of other delegations.12 The other proposal tabled by

the U.S.S.R. was entitled Rescue of Astronauts and Spaceships Making
Emergency Landings.3 Inasmuch as portions of the Soviet draft of Basic
Principles included matters concerning the "assistance and return" of
astronauts and space vehicles, the United States delegation felt that "assistance and return" should be considered in a separate document. Furthermore, the United States considered "assistance and return" a subject of
greater urgency and that action thereon should not await adoption of a
statement of general principles. 4
From the discussions in the First Session of the Legal Subcommittee,
it is fair to conclude that there was general recognition that agreement
on the subject of "assistance and return" was both practicable and desirable. However, it was evident from the outset that the Communist Bloc
countries preferred initially the adoption of a declaration which "could
also include principles, not contained in Resolution 1721 (XVI)" on the
practical approach to exploration and use of outer space.1" On the other
hand, the Western countries took the position that any attempt to draw
up a comprehensive code governing space activities would be premature
in view of existing knowledge and should, therefore, be postponed. The
Western States felt that it would be more productive to identify the
specific legal problems that might require detailed action at an early stage
(i.e., assistance to and return of space vehicles and crews and liability for
damage arising out of space accidents)."
The subject of "liability" for space vehicle accidents is doubtless the
most complex of the matters considered in detail by the Legal Subcommittee. It was apparent to the delegates at the First Session that work
would have to be extensive before all of the problems would even be
identified. The United States proposal placed particular emphasis on two
of the principles: (1) that "the liability of a launching State or organization should be absolute; to require proof of negligence would generally
be tantamount to denying the possibility of compensation;" and (2)
"liability should attach whether injury or damage occurred on land, on
the sea or in the air."17 (It was probably premature to attempt to deal
2 The United States delegate stated that the proposal was already essentially contained in U.N.
GEN. Ass. RES. 1721 (XVI)

20 Dec. 1961. See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7 at 8 (1962).

Debate also centered on whether or not such a convention was necessary or desirable. See U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.2 at 6 (1962). The discussions of the meetings were summarized
and published in the form of Summary Reports [hereinafter cited as SR.].
13U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2 (1962).
14SR.7 at 10.

" id. at 5. The Soviet Bloc countries have continued to propose a codification of the basic principles in convention form.
"sSee statements by the United Kingdom delegate, SR.3 at 3; the Australian delegate, SR.4 at
3; and the Canadian delegate, SR.9 at 7. Even the Hungarian delegate agreed that "conditions were
not yet ripe for the enactment of a general code of space law" and that the Subcommittee should
"concentrate on practical problems." SR.5 at 7. There were also discussions regarding whether a
treaty or a General Assembly resolution was the most appropriate vehicle to achieve the purposes
in connection with "assistance and return." The United States delegation favored a resolution.
The Czechoslovakian delegate advocated a treaty. See SR.1 at 8 and SR.8 at 6. As a possible compromise, the French delegate suggested that work proceed simultaneously on a draft resolution and
draft treaty. SR.9 at 2.
7
" SR.1 at 9.
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with the subject of collisions between spacecraft in outer space.)
As to the United States proposal for a panel of experts to study the
question of "liability," the Czech delegate noted:
that the preparation of such a treaty had better be entrusted to a working
group consisting of representatives of the States which were members of the
Subcommittee and which would be selected on the basis of geographical distribution, rather than to a working group of legal experts appointed by the
Secretary General."
This deadlock over formation of a working committee stood as a barrier
against immediate progress on the subject of "liability."
Aside from the debate over procedures, some views were expressed with
respect to the United States proposals. The need was stressed for definitions
of certain terms such as "space vehicle" and "space;" licensing of some
form was recommended to assure international responsibility; and if the
negligence or fault on the part of the victim were to be considered, distinctions would have to be made as to the manner in which the damage
occurred. This would bring into consideration relevant legislation concerning collision of aircraft, interference with radio communications,
etc." It was also noted that in the case of a joint project between States

the test for "liability" might be "jurisdiction, in the sense of effective control over the space vehicle, rather than ownership, ' 2° and that consideration should be given to establishing joint and several liability where two
or more states are involved in a launching. The principle to govern the
collision of space vehicles was another item indicated for consideration.
Therefore, except for a few questions raised and a few views expressed, no
real substantive progress was made in the First Session on the subject of

"liability."
At its meeting in New York in September 1962, the Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space merely transmitted to the General Assembly
for its consideration the United States and Soviet proposals previously
submitted. The General Assembly reviewed the report submitted by the
parent Committee and on 14 December 1962, adopted Resolution 1802
(XVII) which, inter alia, noted with regret that the Committee had not
yet made recommendations on legal questions connected with the peaceful
uses of outer space. It further requested the Committee,
to continue urgently its work on the further elaboration of basic legal
principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of
outer space and on liability for space vehicle accidents and on assistance
to and return of astronauts and space vehicles and on other legal problems.
III.

SECOND SESSION OF LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

This session of the Subcommittee was held in New York and comprised
thirteen meetings from 16 April to 3 May 1963. Most of the discussion con1 SR.2 at 7.

"Comments by the Swedish delegate, SR.I I at 2.
'0 Comments by the United Kingdom delegate, SR.10 at 5.
" Id. at 7.
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cerned the various "basic principles" raised during the First Session. Four
drafts were tabled on the subject of basic principles. The U.S.S.R. resubmitted its draft treaty"' with a few revisions. One of the revisions recognized that intergovernmental or international organizations might be involved in space activities and provided that each participating State had to
abide by "the principles set forth in this Declaration."" The Soviet's revised
draft also included two new articles, one stipulating that ownership of space
objects remains unaffected after launchU and that a State "undertaking
activities in outer space bears international responsibility for damage done"
as a result of such activities."2 The United States also introduced a draft
General Assembly resolution covering basic principles;" the United Arab
Republic introduced a Draft Code for International Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;" and the United Kingdom submitted a
working paper summarizing the principles on which substantial agreement
had been achieved. 2
An examination of these four drafts reveals a substantial amount of
agreement on basic principles." The United States delegate summarized
the areas of agreement to include:
The freedom of outer space and celestial bodies, the application of the
United Nations Charter and relevant principles of international law to relations among States in outer space, the principle that exploration and use of
space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind, the principle that all possible assistance should be rendered to astronauts
in distress, the principle of return of space vehicles and their personnel to the
launching authority, the principle of international responsibility of the
launching authority for injury, loss or damage caused by its space vehicles,
the principle that ownership of a space vehicle remained unaffected in transit
or on return to the earth and that jurisdiction over a space vehicle and its
personnel in transit were retained by the State or international organization
in which ownership of the vehicle resided at the time of launching. 0

However, there still remained some areas of contention (e.g., the articles
in the Soviet draft condemning the use of outer space for the purpose of
propaganda or obtaining intelligence information and the procedural question of whether the Subcommittee should recommend adoption of a General Assembly resolution or submit a draft treaty for the signature of
States).
It is not necessary to offer a detailed comparison of the provisions of
the four drafts and consider the comments made thereon during the
Second Session since the disputed issues were rendered moot by the adoption by the General Assembly on 13 December 1963, of Resolution 1962

(XVIII) entitled Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activi2

U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O$/C.2/L.6 (1963).
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.
25
Id. art. 11.
26 U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/881 (1963).
2"U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O5/C.2/L.6 (1963).
This was in the form of guidelines for the
work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
28
U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/879 (1963).
29 Documents cited notes 22, 26, 27, 28 supra.
13
24

a°SR.16 at 4.
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ties of States in tbe Exploration and Use of Outer Space. The Declaration
contains nine substantive principles which in large part reflect the extent
of agreement that had been achieved during the First and Second Sessions
of the Legal Subcommittee." Commentary on these principles has been
provided elsewhere.'
This highly important document marked the first widely accepted
codification of "basic principles" governing outer space activities. Insofar
as the work of the Legal Subcommittee was affected, the adoption of the
Declarationof Legal Principles tended to put an end to the debate on that
subject. More important, the Declaration provided an agreed text upon
which further work could proceed. Although many of the problems associated with "assistance and return" and "liability" are quite difficult, their
solution constitutes an implementation of accepted principles-a step
removed from arriving at the principles themselves.
" The guiding principles are as follows:

(1) The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit
and in the interests of all mankind.
(2) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
(3) Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
(4) The activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international cooperation and understanding.
(5) States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space,
whether carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the principles set
forth in the present Declaration. The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer
space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned.
When activities are carried on in outer space by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with the principles set forth in this Declaration shall be
borne by the international organization and by the States participating in it.
(6) In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in
outer space with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States. If a State
has reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by it or its
nationals would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it shall undertake appropriate
international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.
A State which has reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned
by another State would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.
(7) The State on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and any personnel thereon,
while in outer space. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, and of their
component parts, is not affected by their passage through outer space or by their return to the earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the
State of registry shall be returned to that State, which shall furnish identifying data
upon request prior to return.
(8) Each State which launches or procures the launching of an object into outer
space, and each State from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the earth, in air space, or in outer
space.
(9) States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space, and shall
render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency
landing on the territory of a foreign State or on the high seas. Astronauts who make
such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their
space vehicle.
"2Gardner, Outer Space: A Breakthrough for International Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 30 (1964).
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Since most of the debate during the Second Session was concerned with
"basic principles," little time remained for specific discussion of "assistance
and return" and "liability." Regarding the former, the United States and
the U.S.S.R. reintroduced the same drafts which had been discussed in
the First Session.'
On the matter of "liability," significant progress was made in identifying the particular problem areas that would have to be covered in any
international agreement on the subject. The United States reintroduced
its draft "guidelines" which had been considered in the First Session.'
The Belgian delegation also submitted a working paper prepared in the
form of a draft treaty."a This draft was considerably more specific than
the United States draft, and sought to provide a basis for discussion in a
number of areas. Article 1 provided certain definitions, thereby satisfying
a need expressed during the First Session.' The Belgian draft also provided:
(1) that damage occurring in the territory of the launching State or
State of the flag of the space vehicle would not be compensable under the
treaty;
(2) that only States could be liable and only States could seek compensation as "plaintiffs" under the treaty;
(3) that once proof of causation under the national law of the injured
person has been determined, the launching State, flag State or State claiming
ownership, as the case may be, would be liable; and
(4) the procedures to be followed in the settlement of claims, with an
ultimate determination, if necessary, by the International Court of Justice."'
Although no one challenged the concept of liability without fault, there
was considerable discussion regarding limitations on the doctrine where the
"injured" State was guilty of misconduct contributing to the accident,"'
and whether or not the national law of the injured party should govern.
IV.

THIRD AND FOURTH SESSIONS OF LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

Between the adoption of the Declaration of Legal Principles by the
General Assembly and the date of this writing, the Legal Subcommittee
held two sessions. 9 The Third Session was divided into two parts. The
a"The United States draft is U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/L.4 (1963); the Soviet draft is U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.105/L.3 (1963).
34U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/L.5 (1963).
35

U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1OS/C.2/L.7 (1963).
" For example, the Belgian delegate stressed the importance of defining a "space device" in order
to assure applicability of "space law," as opposed to "air law," regardless of whether the space
vehicle was moving in the atmosphere or in outer space. SR.25 at 6. Compare definition of "spacecraft" as "any craft capable of orbital movement or manoeuvre in outer space" in the DRAFT
CODE OF RULES ON THE EXPLORATION ANO USES oF OUTER SPACE (prepared by the Study Group
established by the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies 1962).
" The Soviet Bloc countries opposed submission to the International Court of Justice and preferred instead submission of disputes to arbitration. See statement by the Hungarian delegate,
SR.26 at 5.
" See statements by the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian delegates, SR.25 at 9 and SR.26 at
5, respectively.
" On 13 December 1963, the day on which the General Assembly adopted the Declaration
of Legal Principles, it also unanimously adopted U.N. GEN. Ass. RES. 1963 (XVIII), which, with
respect to the work of the Legal Subcommittee:
(1) Recommends that consideration should be given to incorporating in interna-
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First Part was held in Geneva 9-26 March 1964, with twenty-five of
the twenty-eight member States participating." The Second Part, in which
all twenty-eight members were represented, was conducted in New York
5-23 October 1964. Approximately one year later, the Fourth Session took
place in New York between 20 September and 1 October 1965, with all
members of the Subcommittee represented.
During both parts of the Third and all of the Fourth Session, the draft
conventions on "assistance and return" and "liability" constituted almost
the sole topics of discussion. However, on the first day of the Third Session,
the delegate of the U.S.S.R., followed by other members of the Communist Bloc, insisted that there should be an opening general debate in the
Legal Subcommittee and, further, that the Subcommittee should consider
"general principles" in addition to the two specific topics of "liability"
and "assistance and return." Some delegations agreed that a limited general
debate might be useful but, except for Brazil, no delegation supported the
Soviet position that "general principles" should constitute a third topic of
discussion and work. "'
A general debate was held 9-11 March 1964 with a few general debate
statements extending into 12 and 13 March. The United States did not
participate in this debate but instead used the opportunity to introduce
its texts on "liability" and "assistance and return." By the end of the first
week, it was clear that the majority of the members of the Subcommittee
desired to proceed with work on the two specific topics. The formation of
two Working Groups, each open to the full membership of the Subcommittee, was thus agreed upon: one on "liability" and the other on
"assistance and return." The former group held eight meetings and the
latter six. The Legal Subcommittee held two concluding plenary meetings
on 26 March.
During the Second Part of the Third Session, all of the work took
place in the two Working Groups whose deliberations were not reported
extensively. Only three formal meetings were held, and these were not
of substantial importance. It became apparent by the end of the Third
Session that the "Working Group" procedure had not significantly expedited the proceedings. Therefore, during the Fourth Session, the Subcommittee held formal sessions, the first few to consider the drafts on
"assistance and return" and the remainder to consider the drafts
on
"liability." The remaining discussion in this article will consider, first, the
proceedings during both the Third and Fourth Sessions on "assistance and
tional agreement form, in the future as appropriate, legal principles governing the
activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space;
(2) Requests the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue to study
and report on legal problems which may arise in the exploration and use of outer
space, and in particular to arrange for the prompt preparation of draft international
agreements on liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space and
on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles. . ..
40 See membership note 8 supra. The Subcommittee had been increased to twenty-eight members.
Albania, Chad, and Sierra Leone were absent.
41 Statements of United States delegate, SR.29-37 at 2; Australian delegate at 3; United
Kingdom
delegate at 4.
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return" and, second, the proceedings during both the Third and Fourth
Sessions on "liability."
A. Assistance And Return.
1. Third Session-First Part.
Two draft treaties on "assistance and return" were introduced during
the First Part of the Third Session. The U.S.S.R. introduced a revised
version of the text which it had introduced in the prior two sessions."'
The United States introduced a draft convention considerably more detailed than the draft General Assembly resolution it had introduced in
the previous sessions. " It is noteworthy that by the opening of the Third
Session, agreement had been reached on the duty of signatories to take
all possible steps to rescue astronauts making emergency landings." While
the Soviet delegate cited examples of various kinds of equipment that
might be used in effecting a rescue, the United States draft in Article 2,
paragraph 2, merely required the use of "measures of assistance as may be
necessary under the circumstances." Substantial agreement existed on the
duty to notify the "launching State," as specified in the Soviet draft, or
the "State of registry or international organization responsible for the
launching, or the Secretary General of the United Nations," as specified
in the United States draft.
That the Subcommittee was some distance from arriving at a final
text on "assistance and return" is evident from the number of areas on
which different views existed. There was some difference of opinion over
the procedure to be followed where the State on whose territory the space
vehicle landed was unable to render the necessary assistance. Both the
United States and U.S.S.R. appeared to agree on the imposition of a mandatory obligation on such a State to request assistance from the launching
State and the corresponding duty of the launching State to respond. However, as pointed out by the Swedish delegate, "every State must have the
right to refuse representatives of a foreign State entry to areas which were
of military importance or vital to the security of the State."' Adoption
of the Swedish delegate's view would render discretionary an obligation
theretofore conceived of as mandatory.
Considerable debate took place over provisions concerning rescue on
the high seas or elsewhere beyond territory under national jurisdiction or
control. The United States draft contemplated a joint search by any of
the contracting parties in a position to conduct the necessary search and
rescue operations where an emergency landing is made on the high seas
or Antarctica. The Soviet draft, however, would permit the launching
State to reserve for itself the exclusive right to carry out search and rescue

operations in a zone of the high seas designated by itself. The Soviet version
was criticized as being inconsistent with the humanitarian desire to have
4U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O5/C.2/L.2/REv. 1 (1964).
43
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.IOS/C.2/L.9 (1964).
"See statements by the Soviet delegate, SR.29-37 at 32, and the United States delegate at IS.
41 SR.29-37 at 56.
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assistance rendered as quickly as possible. As stated by the Italian delegate,
"It would be quite wrong to prevent an organization or a State from
undertaking a search for and the rescue of a spaceship."'
Both the Soviet and the United States drafts contained provisions requiring the prompt and safe return of astronauts and space objects subject,
in the case of the latter, to furnishing identifying data upon the request
of the State finding such objects. In the Working Group, however, France
desired the inclusion of a provision which would permit the State on
which a landing took place to hold an astronaut for prosecution of crimes
committed by the astronaut after landing."
Article 9 of the Soviet draft conditioned the duty to return spaceships,
satellites, capsules, and equipment contained therein upon prior official
announcement of the launch. The United States draft contained no such
limitation. In the Working Group, the Japanese delegate sought to amend
Article 3 of the United States draft to require registration with the
Secretary General of each object launched into outer space either prior to
or immediately following the launching." The United States "questioned
the necessity for and practicality of these proposals" since prior registration of launchings had already been covered in General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI).

A number of other limitations on the duty to return was suggested.
Japan proposed that the obligation of a contracting party to return a
space object should be conditioned upon acceptance by the State of registry or cognizant international organization of the obligations specified in
the convention on liability for damage."0 France suggested that the State
on whose territory a space object landed might retain it subject to the
concurrence of the launching authority. Sweden suggested adding language
to require that the State on whose territory a space object landed safeguard the object and permit examination by the launching authority."
Article 9 of the Soviet draft limited the duty to return to space objects
launched for "peaceful" purposes (presumably, determined by the State
in which the object has landed).
Some discussion took place on the extent to which States conducting
rescue operations should be reimbursed by the launching authority. Article
10 of the Soviet draft provided, in effect, that reimbursement should be
provided for expenses incurred in returning astronauts and in the salvage
4
6

4

Id. at 68.

The French proposal, WG.I/21, was submitted as an amendment to a draft submitted in the
Working Group by Australia and Canada, WG.I/17. The French proposal read as follows:
A Contracting Party shall not oppose the departure from its territory of persons
on board a spacecraft which has made an emergency landing and shall do its utmost
to assist them in making travel arrangements.
The present article shall not be construed as preventing juridical or administrative
proceedings, or the enforcement of measures resulting from such proceedings, instituted by reason of the deeds or words of such persons after the completion of operations relating to the emergency landing.
48 The Japanese amendment is WG.I/9.
4 See address by Paul G. Dembling, Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association, Washington, D.C., 11 Sept. 1964.
" WG.I/23.
"' France, WG.I/22; Sweden, WG.I/20.
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and return of space objects. The United States draft contained no comparable provision, although the Western nations generally agreed that a
comparable provision should be included." It was generally agreed that
no reimbursement should be required as consideration for carrying out
the humanitarian duty of rendering assistance to astronauts.
Concerning settlement of disputes, Article 4 of the United States draft
provided for reference to the International Court of Justice by any contracting party. In the Working Group, the British delegate suggested that
reference to the International Court of Justice should follow only upon
inability of the parties to settle a dispute "by other peaceful means of their
own choice. '' "aThe U.S.S.R., which did not have a provision on settlement of disputes in its draft, suggested adding the words "with the consent of all the parties to the dispute" to the United States draft." As reflected in a statement by the Mongolian delegate,5 some of the delegates
may have been under the misapprehension that Article 4 of the United
States draft sought to enlarge the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice. The United States delegate later explained"8 that the relevant
clauses in the United States drafts on "assistance and return" and on
"liability" would confer jurisdiction on the Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute; the matters referred to
the Court would be "specially provided for ... in treaties and conventions
in force."'"
Differences of opinion existed with respect to States eligible to become
signatories, the number of States whose ratification or accession is required
for the agreement to become effective, and the amendment process. With
respect to authorized signatories, Article 12 of the Soviet draft specified

that "all States" are eligible, while Article 7 of the United States draft
permitted only members of the United Nations or States invited by the
General Assembly to become parties to the agreement. In order for the
convention to enter into force, the Soviet draft required at least fifteen
ratifications while the United States required only two. Amendments to
the convention, according to Article 5 of the United States draft, would
become effective upon acceptance by a simple majority of the contracting
parties, although States not individually accepting an amendment would
not be bound by it. The Soviet version did not contain a provision for
amendment.
2. Third Session-Second Part.
Considerable progress was made on the subject of "assistance and return" during the Second Part of the Third Session." Along with the
See statement by the Canadian delegate, SR.29-37 at 25.
sa WG.I/13.
54 WG.I/I2.
12

" SR.29-37 at 60.

56 Id.

at 91-92.

5' STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 3, authorizes States to refer disputes to the Court by mutual con-

sent. It is with respect to paragraph 2 that the United States and other nations have made various
reservations.
8
" See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/21, Annex I (1964).
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United States draft previously submitted, Working Group I considered a
revised version of the earlier draft submitted by the U.S.S.R." and a revised version of a joint Australia-Canada draft."' By the end of the Third
Session, tentative agreement had been reached on the wording of the
Preamble and three articles of the convention on "assistance and return.""1
Article 2 of the agreed draft requires a State learning of an accident or
distress involving space personnel of another State to notify immediately
both the State which announced the launching and the Secretary General.
Article 3 provides that where space personnel have made an emergency
landing in territory under the jurisdiction of a contracting party, "it
shall immediately take all possible steps, within the limits of the means
at its disposal, to rescue the personnel and render them the necessary
assistance." The assistance to be furnished may not differ from the assistance which the State may furnish to its own personnel, and the State
rendering assistance may request technical aid from the State announcing
the launching "under the direction and control" of the party rendering
assistance.
Article 6 of the agreed draft concerns return of space objects, as distinguished from assistance to personnel, and covers landings within the
territory or jurisdiction of a contracting party, or on the high seas, or
elsewhere. Paragraph 1 imposes the same duties of notification upon the
contracting party who learns that such a landing has taken place as are
contained in Article 2 of the agreed draft. Paragraph 3 imposes a duty
on the State announcing the launching, upon notice, to take "prompt and
effective steps" to remove or render harmless a space object or component
thereof which is of a hazardous and deleterious nature. In addition, if
the State announcing the launching knows that a space object which has
landed on the territory of a contracting party is of a "hazardous or deleterious nature," it must immediately notify the contracting party and,
upon request, remove it or render it harmless. Paragraph 4 permits the
contracting party recovering the space object to request the technical assistance of the State announcing the launching. Paragraph 5 requires the
State announcing the launching to furnish identifying data upon request.
The omission of a paragraph 2 from the agreed draft reflects the lack of
agreement on Article 6, paragraph 2, of the revised Soviet draft which
conditions the return of space objects upon whether the launching was
for purposes in accord with the Declaration of Legal Principles.
Some of the other aspects of the "assistance and return" drafts which
were discussed, but upon which there was no final agreement, are as
follows:
(1) As in previous sessions, the U.S.S.R. wished to condition the return of space objects upon compliance by the launching authority with
the Declarationof Legal Principles. The Soviet delegate also suggested that
59U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2/REv. 2 (1964).
e0WG.I/30.
" The language tentatively agreed upon is found in U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/21, Annex III
(1964) [hereinafter agreed draft].
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the return of astronauts be similarly conditioned. This proposal was substituted for the earlier Soviet version that a State should only be obligated to
return space personnel and objects when the launching was for purposes
of "peaceful" exploration and use of outer space. The substituted version,
of course, was intended to provide more objective criteria, although the
Declaration can easily be interpreted in accordance with one's political
views. The Japanese delegate continued to advocate that the return of a
space object should be dependent upon announcement of the launching
and registration of the object with the United Nations. Some other delegations suggested that return of a space object be conditioned upon assurances that compensation for any damage would be received.
(2) On reimbursement for expenses incurred in rescue operations, it
was generally agreed that a State which returns an object to a launching
State should be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in the recovery and
return of the object if a request for return had been made by the
launching authority. The view was also expressed that the launching State
should pay the expenses of recovering a space object regardless of whether
the return had been requested. Contrary to the view previously expressed
that assistance to astronauts is a humanitarian duty and should not require reimbursement, some States argued that the expenses of locating
astronauts should be reimbursed for the reason that, unlike rescues at sea
where all seafaring nations may have personnel in distress, the rescue of
astronauts will be for the benefit of only a few States."2
(3) The Soviet Union withdrew its earlier provision, on which there
was considerable opposition, empowering the launching authority to reserve to itself exclusive jurisdiction over an area of the high seas for the
purpose of conducting rescue operations. Instead, Article 4 of the Soviet
revised draft provided that, "These operations shall be directed by the
State which officially announced its launching of the spaceship concerned or
by such other State as it may request to take charge thereof."
(4) Debate also continued over the question of whether international
organizations should be permitted to possess rights and duties under the
convention independent of the States comprising such organizations.
(5) On the matter of accession, the United States continued to adhere
to its position that only members of the United Nations or States invited
by the General Assembly may become parties. The Soviet delegate continued to insist that "all States" should be eligible to accede.
(6) Some delegations urged that the "assistance and return" convention should be linked with the convention on "liability" in that a State
would have obligations with respect to the launching State under the
"assistance and return" agreement only in the event the launching State
had ratified the "liability" agreement. 3

3. Fourth Session.
In view of the tentative agreement achieved during the Third Session
02 See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/21, Annex I (1964).
63 Ibid.
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on the Preamble and three articles of the "assistance and return" convention, a real effort was made to resolve some of the problems remaining.
Much discussion revolved around a general statement of the duties of
"assistance and return" with the point of departure being Article 1 of
the latest revision of the Soviet draft" which provides that:
(1) Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this agreement, render all possible assistance to the crews of spaceships in
the event of accident, distress or emergency landing; to this end it shall
employ every means at its disposal, including electronic and optical equipment, means of communication, and rescue facilities of various kinds.
(2) Each Contracting State shall foster international cooperation in the
conduct of operations to find and salvage space objects launched in accordance with the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.

Two drafting suggestions were made. One, that the term "Contracting
State" be replaced by the term "Contracting Party." The change would
render the provision consistent with the existing articles of the agreed
draft and make clear that international organizations have the same general duties as States." Two, the deletion of the phrase "including
electronic and optical equipment, means of communication and rescue
facilities of various kinds" was also suggested. As the Argentine delegate
stated, "Such an enumeration was of a restrictive character and would be
a negation of the general nature of the principle of assistance."" The
Soviet delegate defended the enumeration as being solely for the purpose
of illustration. When the Argentine delegate suggested substituting the
words "including the most modern and efficient means placed at their
disposal by the progress of technology," the Soviet delegate accepted this
version." Agreement therefore appears to have been reached on Article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft."'
While Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft requires assistance to
be rendered to space personnel regardless of the purpose for which they
are launched, paragraph 2 conditions the obligation to salvage space objects
upon whether the launch was in accord with the Declaration of Legal
Principles. (At previous sessions, the U.S.S.R. had substituted compliance
with the Declaration for requiring that the launch be conducted for
"peaceful" purposes. However, the substitution hardly changes the subjectivity of the condition and, as the Hungarian delegate stated, the reference to the Declarationis intended to mean the same as requiring a space
object to be launched for "peaceful" purposes.)" The Soviet view was
opposed by the United States delegate who proposed a new draft of
64 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O5/C.2/L.2/REv. 2 (1964).

"' Statements of the Rumanian delegate, SR.42 at 9; the French delegate, SR.42 at 8; and the
Argentine delegate, SR.43 at 4.

66 SR.42 at 6. See also the statements of the Rumanian delegate, id. at 9, and the Mexican
delegate, id. at 7.
67 SR.43 at 4.
eSThe Mexican delegate felt that the Subcommittee could provisionally approve Article 1,
paragraph 1, subject to drafting final language. SR.43 at 3.
o, SR.44 at 8.
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Article 1 which, in paragraph (c), would require contracting parties "to
return to the Launching State space objects and component parts upon
the furnishing of identifying data, if requested, prior to return."7 This
proposal was rejected by the Soviet delegate.
Some of the other delegates, noting the deadlock existing with respect
to Article 1, paragraph 2, suggested some possibilities for compromise.
The Mexican delegate noted the validity of the objection that one State
acting unilaterally should not be permitted to decide whether a launch
had been undertaken in accordance with the Declaration. He suggested
that the launching State and the State required to render assistance
should be able to agree to establish an arbitration proceeding to decide
whether the launch had been in accordance with the Declaration.' The
Austrian delegate felt that resolution of this matter should be held in
abeyance pending agreement on a procedure for the settlement of disputes.
The Rumanian delegate objected to this suggestion on the ground that the
question of machinery for settling disputes was not the same as the argument over principles on the basis of which differences would be settled."'
Towards the close of debate on this subject, the Mexican delegate noted
that the compliance with the Declaration, insisted upon by the Soviet
delegate, is really related to the question of return of astronauts and space
vehicles, and not to assistance. The duty to return could be made subject
to obligations spelled out in other articles of the convention and agreement could be reached, in Article 1, on the general duty of assistance to
astronauts and space vehicles without reference to the Declaration. This
delegate suggested that the United States draft be accepted with the following addition: "The return of astronauts and space objects to the
launching State shall be governed by provisions of the Agreement set
forth hereunder."7a The Mexican suggestion constitutes a possible basis for
compromise if it is agreed that the Soviet position should prevail on the
question of the duty to return, i.e., subject to settlement of the issue of
compliance with the Declaration by arbitration, referral to the International Court of Justice, or some other procedure. That such a result may
be achieved at a later session may be surmised from the debate which took
place on the subject of return.
The debate over the obligation to return astronauts and space objects
revolved around Article 5 and Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft."4
Article 5 reads as follows:
Each Contracting State shall do its utmost to facilitate the earliest possible
return to their own country of the crew of a spaceship which was launched
in accordance with the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and which has met
with an accident, been in distress or made an emergency landing in its
territory or which it has rescued elsewhere.
70

Id. at 3.
7' SR.43 at 3.
72 SR.44 at 4-5.
73
74

Id. at 5.
U.N.

Doc.

No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2/REv.

2

(1964).
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Article 6, paragraph 2, provides:
Each Contracting State shall, at the request of the State which officially
announced the launching thereof, return to that State foreign spaceships,
satellites and capsules launched in accordance with the Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, together with the equipment they contain, or parts of any such
objects discovered in its territory or found by it elsewhere.
These provisions of the Soviet draft were considered generally acceptable
except for the references to the Declarationof Legal Principles. Article 3
of the United States draft"5 and Articles 5 and 6 of the Australia-Canada
Working Group draft, as amended,"0 imposed a comparable duty to return
personnel and space objects but without specifically subjecting the obligation to compliance with the Declaration of Legal Principles.
In the debate on Article 5 of the Soviet draft, the United States delegate argued that the obligation to return astronauts should be based on
paragraph 9 of the Declaration which, on its face, imposes the unconditional obligation to return all astronauts whose landing is attributable
to an emergency. Reliance should not be placed upon the subjective judgment of any particular State as to the purpose of the launch." The Canadian delegate stated his belief that the General Assembly had not intended
that the Declarationbe incorporated by reference into a specific convention
governing a particular aspect of space activities. The principles were intended to constitute "a set of guidelines, to be taken into account in the
drafting of rules on specific matters, but not having themselves the
character of treaty provisions." By incorporating the Declaration's principles by reference, there was the further danger of modifying and limiting
what were intended to be general principles. The obligation to return
astronauts was stated without limitation in paragraph 9. Article 5 of the
Soviet draft "seemed to imply, however, that the reference to the Declaration was intended to make the return of astronauts subject to conditions,"
which language might constitute an amendment of the Declaration by
implication. 8 The Australian delegate concurred, remarking that if the
Soviet version were adopted, "the fate of an astronaut would hang on a
lawyer's debate as to whether or not a launching had been in conformity
with criteria which the entire subcommittee knew were general and imprecise and must inevitably lead to the widest divergence of opinion. ' ' "'
The Soviet, Rumanian, and Bulgarian delegates defended conditioning
the obligation to return astronauts upon compliance with the Declaration
on the ground that launchings not in compliance with the Declaration are
hostile, the implication being that the astronauts involved should be treated
as spies or as prisoners of war. It was argued that Article 5 of the Soviet
draft does not modify the Declaration as the Canadian delegate had suggested, since any extension of the convention to obligate States to return
7

5 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1OS/C.2/L.9
70 WG.I/30.

SR.46 at 3-4.
71 SR.47 at 3.
79 Id. at 6-7.
17

(1964).
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astronauts where the launching was otherwise than in compliance with
the Declarationwould involve an extension of the mandate of the Declaration. As the Bulgarian delegate pointed out, paragraph 9 of the Declaration "had to be read in the context of the Declaration as a whole and
the phrase 'envoys of mankind' could not be interpreted as covering
astronauts engaged in military activities which were a threat to world
peace." No real answer was made to the objection against the unilateral
nature of a determination as to whether a launching has complied with
the Declaration. The Soviet delegate merely stated that "the actual definition of the obligation in question could not be influenced by the difficulty
or ease of determining the facts.""
As a compromise, the French delegate proposed that if it is agreed that
there should be exceptions to the general duties of "assistance and return,"
an article could be included stating that all or part of the convention be
applied only to certain categories of persons. He noted, however, the
difficulties in applying such a provision due to the "dangers inherent in
definitions." As an example he cited the general consensus that military
personnel employed as astronauts should not be denied the benefits of the
convention simply because of their military status.8
Consistent with his suggestion made in connection with Article 1, the
Mexican delegate proposed that Article 5 of the Soviet draft also provide
for the establishment of an arbitration commission comprised of the
launching and recovering parties to determine whether the launching of
a spacecraft whose crew was to be returned had been in accordance with
the Declaration.Pending resolution of the controversy, the State on which
a landing had been made would guarantee the safety of the astronauts.
If the controversy could not be settled, a tripartite arbitration commission
could be established which would determine whether the astronauts should
be returned on the basis of evidence presented.8 The Soviet delegate rejected this suggestion by saying that the settlement of disputes is a matter
related to the whole of the agreement and should be considered separately
from the obligation to return.88 The Mexican delegate suggested that the
words "in accordance with the Declaration .

. . ."

be deleted and replaced

by the phrase, "with the aim of using outer space for peaceful purposes.""
Although the United States and Soviet delegates appear to have taken
opposite positions on the question of conditioning the obligation to return
upon compliance with the Declaration, the matter is not hopeless. It is
possible that agreement might be achieved on a somewhat different version
of Article 5. If suitable language changes are made together with an
adequate provision for the settlement of disputes, the objections concerning the obligation to return might be satisfied.
The last item discussed during the Fourth Session concerning the "assist8°See statements of the Soviet delegate, SR.46 at 3; the Bulgarian

Rumanian delegate, SR.47 at 5-6.
8 SR.47 at 9.
88 SR.46 at 5.
88Id. at 6.
14SR.45 at 8.

delegate, id. at 4; and the
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ance and return" drafts was the matter of assistance to astronauts on the
high seas or elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any State. When the
session opened, three draft provisions were before the Subcommittee.
Article 4 of the Soviet draft provided:
If information is received or it is discovered that astronauts have alighted
owing to accident or distress, on the high seas or in any other place not under
the sovereignty of any State, search and rescue operations shall be conducted
by such Contracting States as are in a position to carry out these operations.
These operations shall be directed by the State which officially announced its
launching of the spaceship concerned or by such other State as it may request
to take charge thereof."
Article 2 of the United States draft provided for a "joint search by
those Contracting Parties which may be in a position to conduct search
and rescue operations in the event personnel of a spacecraft are presumed
to have made an emergency landing on the high seas or Antarctica.""
Article 4 of the Australia-Canada Working Group draft provided that
where there is an emergency landing
on the high seas or in any other place not under the sovereignty, jurisdiction
or control of any State, and the launching State is not in a position immediately to undertake effective search and rescue operations, such operations
shall be conducted, in close and continuing cooperation with the Launching
State, by those Contracting Parties which are in a position to do so."
From a reading of the above proposed provisions and from discussions
that had taken place in previous sessions, it is clear that the issue to be
resolved is the extent to which the launching authority should be permitted to have the legal right to control search and rescue operations in
an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any State. As previously noted,
the present Soviet draft had been substituted for a previous version which
would have permitted the launching authority to cordon off an area of
the high seas for a search exclusively with its own facilities. The practical,
objection to the early Soviet version was that ships, airplanes, etc., of
other States closest to the space vessel would be barred from effecting a
rescue. The present Soviet draft, while less extreme than the earlier draft,
continued to require technical direction of the rescue operation by the
launching State or its designee. The Soviet delegate contended that where
a landing is made in a place not under the jurisdiction of any State, national
sensibilities, understandable where the landing is within the territory of
contracting States, are out of place and that the only State in possession
of all the necessary technical data ought to have the right to direct, "by
its recommendations," the course of rescue operations."
The French delegate opposed the Soviet formula on two grounds. First,
in the event of "real emergency," it was essential that the State most
favorably located to take immediate rescue measures should be able to
5

' U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2/REv. 2 (1964).
6"U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.9/REv. 2 (1964).
87 WG.I/30.
"SR.45 at 7-8.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 32

do so without waiting for directives from another State. Second, it is
possible that a State would be required to choose between the lives of
the astronauts and, for example, the crews of ships which it had sent to
the rescue scene. "It was for that State alone to make such a choice." For
these reasons, the French delegate would object even to the formulation
in the Australia-Canada draft which required "close and continuing
cooperation with the Launching State," the implication being that the
recommendations of the launching State are deemed binding. He would
accept, however, a formulation requiring the States effecting the rescue
to "take account of" the recommendations of the launching State. 8'
The United States delegate stated that he would prefer a formulation
along the lines of the Australia-Canada draft which would require rescue
operations to be conducted "in close and continuing cooperation with
the Launching State, by those Contracting Parties which are in a position
to do so." He then proposed to add the following sentence: "The operations shall be conducted in a manner designed to assure speedy rescue and
taking account of requests and technical advice from the State which announced the launching."" The added sentence comports with the language
suggested by the French delegate.
The Soviet delegate rejected the French suggestion and the last sentence
of the United States proposal. But, "in a spirit of compromise," he proposed substituting the following for the second sentence of Article 4 of
the Soviet draft:
These operations shall be conducted in such a way as to ensure rapid rescue
and to this end the State which announced the launching shall undertake
general coordination of the rescue operations. These operations shall be carried
out in accordance with the recommendations and technical advice of the
State which announced the launching.91
In the opinion of the Soviet delegate, "general coordination" meant something quite different from "direction or giving orders." However, even
though he regarded rapid rescue the primary objective, he still felt that
this objective would best be served by entrusting the direction of operations to the State most competent from the technical point of view. 2
Thus, there now appears to be general agreement on the formulation
of an article governing assistance to astronauts on the high seas or elsewhere outside the territory of any State. If the word "sovereignty" is
replaced by "jurisdiction," as suggested by the Australian delegate, 3 there
will be general agreement on the first sentence of Article 4 of the Soviet
draft. From the debates in the Fourth Session, the only remaining difference of opinion concerning the second sentence is whether general coordination or cooperation with the launching authority should be required
of the States carrying out rescue operations. (The difference is hardly more
s1
Id.at
90
Id. at
91
2 1d. at
9 Id. at
13Id. at

9.

S.
3.

4.
3.
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than one of semantics, or perhaps translation.)

Of course, this article

would not cover landings in States not parties to the convention. One can
only hope that as many States as possible ratify or adhere to the convention.
In considering the present status of the convention on "assistance and
return" in the Legal Subcommittee, it is fair to conclude that the prognosis for agreement on a final text on this subject is good if the members
maintain a spirit of compromise. As discussed above, tentative agreement

was reached in the Third Session on the Preamble and articles governing
notification of accidents, assistance in the territory of a contracting party,
and most aspects of the return of space objects. Various compromises have
been suggested for the settlement of an issue which affects several articles

-whether the obligations of assistance and/or return should be conditioned upon whether the launch was for peaceful purposes or in compliance with the Declarationof Legal Principles.
Agreement has almost been achieved on a formula for rendering assistance in areas not under the jurisdiction of any State. The general agreement that the term "contracting party" should be used instead of "contracting State" indicates that a consensus has been reached in favor of
permitting international organizations to become parties to the agreement
on "assistance and return." Although formalization of a provision on reimbursement remains to be achieved, most of the delegations appear to
be agreed upon a formula requiring reimbursement for all services except
the actual emergency assistance to astronauts which, for humanitarian considerations, should not be reimbursable. Although extensive disagreement
remains on the role which the International Court of Justice might play
in the settlement of disputes, agreement might be reached on an arbitration formula with, perhaps, a provision specifying that a dispute might
be referred to the International Court of Justice subject to the express
consent of the parties. Several final clause problems remain, the most significant being the problem of accession. Admittedly, there is some merit
in the Soviet "all states" formula in view of the possibility that an emergency landing might take place anywhere. However, if there is agreement on all of the substantive articles of the convention, problems of
accession, ratification, and amendment would probably not impose an
insuperable barrier to agreement on a final text.

B. Liability
1. Third Session-First Part
This part of the session constituted the first period during which the
matter of "liability" received detailed consideration. Three drafts were
before the Subcommittee: the Belgian working paper introduced during
the Second Session," a United States draft convention,"5 and a Hungarian
draft convention supported by the U.S.S.R. and other Communist counDoc. No. A/AC.1OS/C.2/L.7 (1963).
9"U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8 (1964).
"'U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.10 (1964).

94U.N.
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tries. That some agreement already existed is evident from the adoption of
paragraph 9 of the Declaration of Legal Principles, discussed above. However, as noted by the Soviet delegate, "everyone had agreed that the
problem of liability was extraordinarily complex"'" because of the multitude of problems and the differences in legal norms applied domestically
by States in determining "liability."
One of the most important and difficult problems was the identification
of States considered liable under the convention. Article I of the United
States draft contained a two-part definition of "State of Registry." The
first part would include contracting parties which have registered space
objects. The United States delegate stated that what was meant by registration was "national registration and that it would be left to each State
to determine the nature of the national registration process." An analogy
was drawn to registration of an aircraft or ship. 98 If, for one reason or
another, a space object had not been registered, a contracting party which
had suffered damage would be assured that it could treat any one of the
countries listed in the second part of the definition as the State of Registry." The Hungarian draft did not contain any provision conditioning
"liability" on registration. Article VII was similar to the second part of
the United States definition in placing "liability" on: (1) the State or
international organization which launched or attempted to launch a space
object, (2) any of the States "participating" in a common undertaking,
(3) the State from whose territory or facilities the launch was made, or
(4) the State which owns or possesses the space vehicle or object causing
the damage. A difference was that, while the Hungarian draft would
render "States" liable, the United States draft would apply only to "contracting parties." The Rumanian delegate believed that the United States
version would make it impossible to obtain compensation from a State
which had not adhered to the convention.
The matter of defining the parties who should be considered liable provoked initial discussion of the "liability" of international organizations
and joint space ventures, considered in greater detail during the Fourth
Session. Concerning international organizations, Article VIII of the Hungarian draft provided that if an international organization is found to be
liable, the financial obligations toward States suffering damage would be
met by the international organization and its members. Neither the United
States nor the Belgian drafts contained a comparable provision. The
omission of a provision from the United States draft concerning the
"liability" of international organizations was criticized by the Soviet
delegate who regarded the Hungarian draft as protecting the interests of
States suffering damage by enabling them to claim compensation from
any State belonging to the organization concerned.'
97SR.29-37
9

at 84.
8Id.at 27. Compare Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), 4 April
1947, art. 19, 61 Stat. 1180, T.S. No. 102 (effective 7 Dec. 1944).
99Ibid.
°"°SR.29-37 at 86.
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The Australian delegate had sought to remedy the alleged defect in
the United States draft by proposing an amendment.' in the Working
Group that: (1) would impose "liability" on an international organization
that had notified the Secretary General of its acceptance of the provisions
of the convention; (2) would require the contracting parties to the convention to use their best efforts to ensure that all international organizations conducting space activities would in fact be authorized by their
respective charters to accept the obligations of the convention; and (3)
where an international organization has made the requisite declaration,
each constituent member of the organization (which is also a party to
the convention) would undertake the same "liability" as that attached
to the organization in respect to damage for which the organization is
itself liable. Under the proposed Australian amendment, States which are
members of an accepting international organization but which are not
parties to the convention would not be liable.'
Article 5 (c) of the Belgian draft and Article VII of the Hungarian
draft contained provisions specifying that "liability" shall be joint in the
case of joint space ventures. According to the Soviet delegate, by "joint"
liability was meant that the "liability" of the participants in a joint
venture shall be "joint and several"-that is, a State suffering damage
could claim the full amount of compensation from any of the participants
in the venture, thereby leaving the participants to apportion the "liability"
among themselves." 3 The Australian delegate concurred in this view, stating further that where two or more States are concerned in a joint launching, they would probably enter into indemnity arrangements "wholly
collateral to the United Nations convention, as to how a liability to which
any one of them was assessed under the convention would be apportioned."'" Although there appeared to be no argument against the applicability of the concept of joint and several liability to joint space ventures,
the formulation of this concept into acceptable language would pose drafting difficulties.
As was the case in the Second Session, there was no serious disagreement
with the principle of absolute liability as expressed in Article III of the
United States draft. Absolute liability means, as stated by the United
States delegate, "that an injured party would not have to prove negligence
on the part of the launching authorities.''. The Hungarian delegate stated
'0' WG.II/6. Compare Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 25 May
1962, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS; CURRENT DOCUMENTS 685 (1963), where damage engages the
liability of more than one operator and the damage attributed to each operation is not readily
ascertainable, the operators involved shall be jointly and severally liable for such damage. Further-

more, it is stipulated that the liability of any one operator shall not exceed a limit provided for
in the convention. In the case of joint and several liability each operator shall have a right of
contribution against the other in proportion to the fault of each. Where the degree of fault cannot
be apportioned the total liability shall be borne in equal parts.
s0' The Australian delegate explained some aspects of his amendment in SR.29-37 at 71.
""Id. at 85. The Rumanian delegate concurred, id. at 90-91.

"'4Id. at 70.
105Id. at 28. For a thorough discussion on all aspects of absolute or strict liability, see Goldie,
Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP.

L.Q. 1189 (1965).
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that except for collisions in outer space, his draft "assumed" the principle
that the launching State was responsible for the damage."° Differences of
opinion, however, were expressed concerning the scope of the exceptions
to absolute liability. In Article III of the United States draft, it was stated
that "gross negligence on the part of the presenting State or persons whom
it represents shall, as appropriate, diminish or expunge any obligation to
pay compensation." The term "gross negligence" was not defined. The
comments made revealed that "gross negligence" was not only vague
but capable of misinterpretation for the reason that other legal systems
might define the term to mean either greater or lesser culpability than is
meant by the use of the term in Anglo-Saxon law." 7 The Canadian delegate suggested replacing "gross negligence" with "willful and reckless
conduct," a proposition endorsed by the Belgian delegate."' The Italian
delegate favored eliminating the word "gross," thereby permitting an
exemption if the victim had been guilty of ordinary negligence."' The
Czech delegate, consistent with Article VI of the Hungarian draft, advocated exceptions from the principle of absolute liability in the case of a
"willful act" by the State suffering damage or where there is a "natural
disaster.".... The exemption for "natural disaster" was opposed by the
Western States for lack of adequate defining criteria.
A related problem concerned the extent of "liability" in the event of a
collision in outer space. Article III, paragraph 2, of the United States draft
specified that there shall be no "liability" as between States of registry
and international organizations involved in the launching of the colliding
objects. The United Kingdom delegate believed that it would be inequitable for the injured party to have no redress where the conduct of
the State causing injury was willful or reckless and suggested an
amendment to the effect that "liability" would be expunged only in the
case of a collision which was purely accidental and attributable neither to
negligence nor to willful or reckless conduct.11' The United Kingdom
amendment would bring the United States draft closer to Article V of
the Hungarian draft which would permit the injured State to recover if
it could prove fault on the part of the other State where the damage was
caused in outer space. The Canadian delegate further proposed that Article
III, paragraph 2, of the United States draft should be supplemented by a
provision specifying that "liability" subsisted in the event of damage to
third parties suffering from the collision."'
A few other matters raised in the First Part of the Third Session concerning the draft conventions on "liability" deserve brief mention here.
Article IV of the United States draft called for presentation of claims
through diplomatic channels. Paragraph 2 of Article IV provided for
o'0SR.29-37 at 73.
107

See statement by the Japanese delegate, id. at 63.
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id. at 36.
"09id. at
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68.
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72-73.

1966]

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

possible representation of an injured State by a third State where the
former did not have diplomatic relations with the State of registry."3
No objections were raised to this procedure. The Hungarian draft contained substantially the same provision in Article XI.
Some dispute arose over whether the launching authority may be liable
under the convention for damage to its own nationals, wherever located.
Article V of the United States draft and Article IX, paragraph 3, of the
Hungarian draft specifically barred recovery for such persons. India and
Lebanon urged, however, that all damage suffered beyond the territory
of the launching State be compensated under the convention, even if the
victims were nationals of the launching State. They argued, conversely,
that no person within the territory of the launching State, whatever his
nationality, should be covered by the convention. The Argentine delegate
felt that a contracting State should be allowed to present a claim on behalf
of a dual national or stateless person residing within the launching State."'
Concerning applicability of local law, Belgium had proposed in the
Second Session that the determination of the causal relationship between
a launching and the occurrence of damage should be governed by the law
of the launching authority. Hungary proposed that "moral damages" be
compensable if the law of the claimant State so provided. These views
were generally rejected on the ground that the payment of compensation
should not depend upon the divergent criteria imposed by different nations. 115
Article VI of the United States draft provided that a claim presented
under the convention would exclude prosecution of any local remedies or
remedies under other international agreements. As the United States delegate explained, "an injured person who pursued local remedies, or remedies
under another international agreement, would not be able to proceed
under this convention; he must make a choice as to which path he will
follow." ' e As noted by the Swedish delegate, it would be difficult to prevent individuals, who are dissatisfied with the amount recovered under
the convention, from seeking additional compensation from within the
launching authority if local remedies are available. 17 However, there was
general agreement with the United States view to the extent that an injured person ought not to be able simultaneously to pursue remedies under
the "liability" convention and under local law or any other treaty.
Both the United States draft (Article VII) and the Hungarian draft
(Article XII) contained provisions for settlement of claims through arbitration. The United States version was more detailed-specifying the composition of the claims commission and its duties. Recourse to the commission could be had if a claim is not settled within one year of its presentation. The United Kingdom delegate criticized the one-year period as
3 See statement by the United States representative, id. at 28.
14

' Id. at 72.
115 See, e.g., statement by the Canadian delegate, id. at 36.

116 Id. at 29.
7

id. at S8.
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being too short, particularly in cases in which the nature or extent of
damage could not be immediately ascertained.' 8
Peculiar to the United States draft on "liability," Article VIII provided that payment of compensation "shall be made in a currency convertible readily and without loss of value into the currency of the presenting State or commonly used by the presenting international organization."
The British delegate believed that problems of rates of exchange, convertibility, and loss of value could be avoided "if compensation were simply
to be paid in the currency of the presenting State or a currency acceptable
to the presenting international organization.""... Little debate arose over
this provision, undoubtedly because space activities are presently being
conducted only by nations possessing adequate reserves of gold or convertible currencies. Should poorer nations become more seriously involved
in space ventures, consideration would have to be given to extending the
time for payment or permitting compensation to be paid in the currency
of the State incurring "liability."
The United States, in Article IX, proposed that there be a monetary
limitation on the amount of "liability" without specifying the extent of
the limitation. Article II of the Hungarian draft contained a similar provision. This sort of limitation was opposed for the same reasons that existed
with respect to opposition to the one-year limitation on the claims settlement procedure and the one-year statute of limitations in Article III of
the United States draft: insufficient technical data to determine the extent
of "liability" that might arise out of a nuclear accident and whether limitations provisions should1 be drafted to take account of the effects of radioactive contamination. 20
Final clause problems concerning ratification, accession, and amendment were similar to those raised in connection with the drafts on "assist-

ance and return."
2. Third Session-Second Part
Little progress was made on the draft "liability" conventions during
the Second Part of the Third Session, principally because most of the
available time was spent on the "assistance and return" drafts. The drafts
previously submitted by the United States, Belgium, and Hungary were
discussed in Working Group II. Near the close of the session, the United
States delegation introduced a revision of its draft consolidating its previous draft with all of the United States amendments made during the
Second Part of the Third Session."1
The issues discussed during this Second Part were almost entirely the
same as those discussed during the First Part. They may be briefly described

as follows:
...Id. at 54. A case in point would be an injury caused by radiation emanating from the explosion of a nuclear rocket.
"9 Id. at 54.
'"See statement of the Japanese delegate,

id. at 64.
a U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O$/C.2/L.8/REv. 2 (1964). The text is reproduced in Appendix I,

infra.
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(1) The definition of "launching State" posed a difficult problem. The
United States draft included the phrase "procures the launching" within
the definition as meaning "defraying the cost of a launching." Canada
suggested adding the following to the United States concept: "state owning the space vehicle, state that participated in a common undertaking,
and a state operating the object once launched." The term "state" would
be defined so as to include international organizations. The Italian delegation suggested that the "launching State" mean the state which has
notified the Secretary General of a launching and has otherwise complied
with the registration procedure established in Resolution 1721 (XVI).1"2
(2) Although there was general agreement that the launching State
should be absolutely liable for the damage caused, there remained considerable differences over exceptions.
(3) Concerning which body of law should be used to define "damages,"
the Belgian draft indicated that the national law of the injured State would
govern. The United States proposed that "the principles of international
law, justice, and equity" shall determine the extent of compensation for
which a State might be held liable. Some other States indicated a preference
for the application of traditional conflict of laws rules.
(4) Concerning the scope of damage, there was general agreement
that coverage of the convention should be broad; that is, any damage to
persons and property traceable to the launch (e.g., nuclear contamination)
should be covered, and there should be "liability" regardless of whether
the damage is caused by the space object itself or any apparatus used in
the launching. Despite the general agreement in principle, significant
drafting difficulties remained, particularly in view of the need to define
the degree of causal relationship between the launching and the injury.
(5) Discussions took place concerning the treatment of international
organizations under the convention, which involves the specific problem
of the "liability" of the constituent members in the event of default by
123
the organization. The United States proposed, in Article III of its draft,
that a declaration of acceptance of the obligations under the convention
filed by an international organization with the Secretary General contain
a statement as to the manner in which any "liability" incurred by the
organization would be borne by the constituent members. While the
United States version received the support of a few delegations, others
felt that there should be stronger assurances that the individual memberstates of international organizations could be held directly liable.
(6) Concerning the "liability" of participants in joint undertakings,
no progress was made in settling the issue of defining the degree of participation necessary to involve "liability" under the convention although
there was general agreement that the participants, as eventually defined,
would be jointly and severally liable.
(7) The United States adhered to its view that an injured party should
.22See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/21,
" See Appendix I, inIra.

Annex II (1964).
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not be entitled to pursue simultaneously its remedies under the convention
and under local law or other treaty. The United Kingdom delegate did
not favor this exclusion but did not object strenuously to the United
States draft.
(8) Article IV, paragraph 4, of the revised United States draft"'
reflected the view that the statute of limitations should be one year from
the date of the accident. In taking account of cases in which the facts
might not become known until a substantial period after the accident has
elapsed, an additional clause was added permitting a claim to be presented
within one year after the facts become known. Despite this concession,
many delegations argued that a one year period is too short.
(9) Opposition continued against setting any monetary ceiling on
"liability," as provided in both the United States and Hungarian drafts,
but no monetary amount was specified in either draft. The Belgian delegate suggested that consideration be given to separate limitations for
personal injuries and property damage, and favored some provision for
apportionment among claimants.'
(10) Concerning settlement of disputes, considerable debate arose over
Article X of the revised United States draft 2. which provided that, "any
dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this convention
which is not previously settled by other peaceful means of their own
choice, may be referred by any Contracting Party thereto to the International Court of Justice for decision." Even though Article X, can be
read as requiring the specific consent of a party to a particular dispute in
order to be bound by a decision of the International Court of Justice, a
number of States regarded Article X as enlarging the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Although the United States delegate had previously
attempted to explain that such enlargement was not intended, the Communist countries continued to propose that settlement of disputes be limited
to negotiation and arbitration. The United Kingdom and Australian delegations suggested combining arbitration proceedings with referral of disputes to the Court.
(11) The United States, in Article V of its revised draft, 1"7 continued
to bar recovery under the convention on behalf of nationals of a State
incurring "liability." There was little disagreement with this provision.
Hungary proposed adding an additional sentence to exclude the possibility
of compensating foreign nationals participating in the launching.'
(12) The Soviet delegate proposed an amendment specifically stating
that a claim for compensation should not constitute grounds for sequestration of space vehicles."'
"4Ibid.
122Ibid. None of existing treaties appear to offer satisfactory guidance. For example, Article III,
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, note 101 supra, provides for "the
liability of the operator as regards one nuclear ship shall be limited to 1,500 million francs in respect to any one nuclear incident."
2' See Appendix I, infra.
127Ibid.
121 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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3. Fourth Session.
In this session, three draft conventions on "liability" were again before
the Subcommittee. The United States introduced a third revision of its
draft," ' Hungary tabled a revised text of its draft, 3 ' and a revised version
of the Belgian Working Group draft was introduced."2 (These drafts are
reproduced herein in tabular form as Appendix II.)
In introducing his revised draft, the United States delegate noted the
various changes from the previous version." Article II, paragraph 3, had
been redrafted to spell out what was meant by joint and several liability.
Paragraph 2 of Article III had been deleted because of the "confusion"
generated over it during the Third Session. That paragraph had required
international organizations to file a statement indicating how any "liability" assessed to it would be borne by its constituent member States.
Article IV, paragraph 4, had been revised to clarify the interpretation of
the time during which a claim had to be presented. Article VII had been
amended to specify more clearly the procedure for organization of a claims
settlement commission.'34
Introducing his revision, the Hungarian delegate listed the changes in
his draft.'3' In Article I, the words "or other impairment of health" were
added to the list of compensable injuries. On the other hand, nuclear damage was excluded in the belief that the complex problems arising out of
nuclear explosions could be more easily resolved in a separate agreement.
In Article II, an attempt was made to exclude the possibility that the
liable State could evade "liability" through a special legislative act. (As
the Hungarian delegate pointed out, however, such an act would be evidence of bad faith and its validity questionable under general principles
of international law.) Article IV, a revision of the previous Article V, deals
more extensively with assigning "liability" in the event of collision of
space objects. Although still poorly worded, the provision supposedly
reflects the principle of absolute liability, making clear that the State liable
is barred from any exoneration if the damage results from an "unlawful"
activity. Article VI, formerly Article VII, now specifies that the "liability"
of two or more parties involved in a joint launching is joint and several.
The Hungarian and United States drafts appear to agree on this point.
Article VIII is a shortened version of the previous Article IX and provides that a State may make a claim for damage incurred in its territory
or incurred by its citizens or legal entities in its territory or abroad.
Article IX, concerning the time limits for presentation of claims, and
Article XII, providing that a space object is not to be subject to sequestration or enforcement measures, were inserted at the behest of Bulgaria
and the U.S.S.R.
'30 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8/REv. 3 (1964).
'U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.1O$/C.2/L.1O/REv. 1 (1964).
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.IO5/C.2/L.7/REv. 2 (1964).
133 See Appendix I, infra.
134SR.48 at 4-5.
31
1 Id. at 5-6.
'32
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In the debate which followed the tabling of the drafts, most of the
important issues raised in connection with the "liability" convention were
discussed.
a. Definition of Launching State-This issue, raised in previous sessions,
is particularly important in cases where there are two or more States involved in a joint space venture. As pointed out by the United States
delegate, some aspects of the definition of "launching State" had already
been settled by paragraph 8 of the Declaration of Legal Principles, which
provides that each State which launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space, and each State from whose territory or facility an
object is launched, is internationally liable for damage caused by such
object. All three of the drafts agreed that these criteria should be used in
any definition of "launching State." Moreover, there was general agreement that the definition of a launching should include attempted launchings. The United States and Hungarian drafts agreed on the use of the
term "facility," (e.g., a launching from a platform located on the high
seas). Although the United States draft was the only one to use the term
"procures the launching," Article VI of the Hungarian draft rested "liability" "in the case of a common undertaking, with all of the States
participating in the undertaking." The United States draft was the only
one to provide specifically for the inclusion of international organizations
within the definition of "launching State."
The issue which remained to be discussed concerned the criteria, other
than territory, which should be used in formulating a definition of "launching State." Although the words "procures the launching" were used in the
Declaration and in the United States draft, that language had been previously defined to include only those who aided in defraying the cost of
the launching. The United States delegate queried whether some lesser
degree of participation ought to be sufficient to render a State liable in
the event of damage-where a State has one technical observer at a
launching or is responsible for a single experiment in a spacecraft.1" He
further explained that under the United States draft, where State A
furnished a space object to State B, and State B conducted the launching
from its own territory, State A would still be liable in addition to State B.
However, if State A had built a space vehicle and State B had purchased it,
paid for it, and launched it, State A would not be liable." 7 The United
States delegate felt that a very broad definition of "launching State" might
adversely affect international cooperation in the exploration of outer
' Moreover,
space. 38
as the Belgian delegate implied, a definition whose scope
is determined
by
"substantial
participation" would be very difficult to
9
apply.n
The Italian delegate suggested that, as an additional criterion, "launching State" should include "the State which had notified the Secretary
'36 SR. 5I at 4.
1' SR.48 at 3.
"..SR.51 at 9.
"39 ibid.
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General Of the United Nations of a space device and given the data
necessary for its identification for the purpose of entry in the registry
kept by the Secretariat for that purpose."' 4 The use of registration as a
criterion was supported by Japan'' and by the Australian delegate if
registration is regarded as only one of the ways of settling factual questions on which "liability" would depend.'42 The Hungarian and Rumanian
delegates were opposed to the use of this criterion. The Hungarian delegate
thought that, in the future, registration of spacecraft might raise problems
similar to those involved in the registration of vessels."
In the Report of the Legal Subcommittee for the Fourth Session, the
following criteria were listed as having been discussed:'
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Providing territory for the launching of a space object;
Providing facilities for the launching of a space object;
Exercising control over the orbit or trajectory of a space object;
Owning or possessing a space object;
Procuring the launching of a space object;
Participation in the launching of a space object; and
Registration (international or national) of a space object.

Agreement has been largely achieved on the first five of the seven criteria
listed. It is quite possible that, at a later session concerned with "liability,"
a formula for the definition of "launching State" can be realized on the
basis of these five criteria, if the proponents of the last two criteria do not
insist on the inclusion of "participation" and "registration" in the definition.
b. Absolute Liability-In the meetings of the Subcommittee, it was
clear from the outset that there was general agreement that "liability"
should be absolute (i.e., proof of fault would not be required). All three
of the drafts introduced in the Fourth Session provided that "liability"
shall be absolute once causation between the launching and the damage has
been shown. However, debate still exists on the question of whether the
principle of absolute liability, agreed to be applicable to damage caused
on the ground or in the air, should also be applicable to collisions in outer
space. As noted by the Soviet delegate, the Hungarian draft provides that,
in the event of a collision of space objects, compensation would be paid
to the claimant State only if the other State were at fault." On the other
hand, Article II of the United States draft specifically provides that the
principle of absolute liability is applicable to collisions in outer space. The
United States delegate "thought it better to formulate a clear and
simple rule than to allow the highly unlikely possibility of a collision in
space to affect the statement of principle of absolute liability."'" Under
the United States draft, the two launching States would be absolutely
"oSR.51

"Id.

at 4.

at 11.
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liable to each other unless the principles of exoneration are applicable, as
where the willful or reckless conduct of one of the parties extinguishes the
"liability" of the other.
There is considerable merit in the United States draft in that it avoids
requiring answers to difficult questions such as drawing a line between
the atmosphere and outer space. However, the United States draft does
some violence to the idea that a launching State assumes all risks except
for the willful or reckless conduct of the claimant State. For example, if
an expensive satellite collides with an inexpensive satellite, the owner of
the former would be required to pay damages to the owner of the latter.
If, on the other hand, the same inexpensive satellite were to collide with
an airplane, the owner of the inexpensive satellite would be required to
pay damages unless the owner of the airplane were guilty of willful or
reckless misconduct. The Hungarian draft, in canceling out all liabilities
subject to the remote possibility of proving fault, seems to be more consistent with the theory that launching States assume all but certain specified
risks. Perhaps agreement can be achieved on an article applying the
principle of absolute liability to damage incurred on the ground and in
the air. Collisions between space vehicles might then be treated in a
separate article. Such an article would probably become meaningful in
years to come when more and more space objects are launched.
The Italian delegate raised a different problem in connection with
absolute liability. It was his view that the principle of absolute liability,
combined with unlimited liability, would expose small countries engaged
in space activities to grave financial risks. "7 However, this problem can,
perhaps, better be solved through placing a monetary limit on "liability,"
or, as the United States delegate suggested, defining the degree of involvement required in order for a State to be regarded as a launching State.'48
c. Exoneration from Liability-Two possibilities for exoneration from
"liability" were discussed aside, of course, from the failure to show causation between the launching and the damage. From discussions in the
previous sessions there appeared to be general agreement that the launching
authority should be exonerated from "liability" where the claimant State
is guilty of willful or reckless misconduct. However, as noted above, the
formulation of this concept into acceptable language has proved to be
difficult. The term "gross negligence" had been deleted from the United
States draft and replaced by Article II, paragraph 2, which provides that:
if the damage suffered results either wholly or partially from a willful or
reckless act or omission on the part of the Presenting State, or of natural
or juridical persons that it represents, the liability of the launching State to
pay compensation under paragraph 1 of this article shall, to that extent, be
wholly or partially extinguished.
The Belgian draft provides for exoneration in the event of "wilful misconduct" on the part of the applicant State, with a definition of "will141
Id. at 3.
148

Ibid.
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ful misconduct" which renders the Belgian draft quite similar to the
United States version. Article III of the Hungarian draft provides for
exoneration in the event the damage has resulted from a "willful act or
from the gross negligence of the party suffering the damage." The idea of
"partial" exoneration, expressed in the United States draft, was questioned
by the Belgian delegate who wondered what criteria would be applied to
determine the degree of exoneration. " Indeed, if a claimant State is sufficiently culpable to warrant invocation of this ground of exoneration, very
fine distinctions would have to be drawn in order to justify partial instead of total exoneration. However, the objection to the idea of partial
exoneration is not strenuous, and it would not be overly speculative to
predict that agreement will be achieved in the next session on Article II,
paragraph 2, of the United States draft.
The other specific ground for exoneration discussed was that of "natural
disaster," mentioned in Article III of the Hungarian draft. This ground
had been criticized in previous sessions for vagueness. The United States
delegate made the further criticism that, "such an exception would make
a serious inroad into the concept of absolute liability. If a State chose to
engage in a hazardous undertaking it must assume responsibility for all
the consequences, and it would be inequitable for the State where the
damage occurred to have to bear the costs in such cases. 1.. The Austrian
and United Kingdom delegates concurred in the view of the United
States delegate that natural disaster or force majeure is a risk assumed by
the launching State."' The British delegate believed that perhaps the
occurrence of a natural disaster could be taken into account in determining whether there had been causation: "The question to be asked was the
'
following: but for the launching, would the damage have occurred?" '
Of course, the same question could be asked with respect to willful or
reckless misconduct. Although the inclusion of "natural disaster" as an
element of exoneration was supported by the Soviet delegate,"' the prevailing view is that it should be deleted. Nevertheless, the lack of agreement on this point should not prevent agreement on an article providing
for exoneration on account of willful or reckless misconduct by the
claimant State.
The Hungarian draft, in Article V, provides for an exception to exoneration, itself an exception to the general rule of absolute liability.
Article V provides that if the damage has resulted from the "unlawful
activity" of the launching State, "The State liable shall be barred from
any exoneration whatsoever." This provision was supported by the Communist representatives but opposed by the other members as reminiscent
of the objections against unilateral determinations of whether a launching
is in compliance with the Declaration of Legal Principles or for "peaceful"
149SR.50 at S.
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purposes. The Mexican delegate proposed that "the liability convention
contain a provision excluding from its application vehicles not engaged
in the peaceful uses of outer space." This proposition was accepted by the
Hungarian delegate, ' but it is not likely that any such provision would
be acceptable to the members engaged in space activities, who would regard
such a provision as difficult to apply even if differing interpretations were
to be resolved by an adequate disputes procedure. Here again, however,
differences over Article V of the Hungarian draft need not prevent agreement on an article covering exoneration from "liability."

d. Liability of International Organizations-TheFourth Session of the
Legal Subcommittee constituted the first occasion during which extensive
consideration was devoted to the matter of "liability" for damages incurred by international organizations as a result of launchings by such
organizations. There was general agreement that international organizations should, as a matter of policy, and can, as a matter of legal precedent,
be made directly liable for damages without necessarily looking to the
States comprising the organization."5 Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of
Legal Principles provides, in part, that when space activities are carried out
by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with the
Legal Principles "shall be borne by the international organization and by
the States participating in it." The Declaration at least stands for the
proposition that an international organization shall be held responsible as an
entity, although it does not resolve the question of whether the "liability"
of an organization is primary and that of its members secondary, or
whether a claimant State may look to the organization and its member
States simultaneously, or in the alternative.""
On the question of whether the term "international organizations"

should be restricted to intergovernmental organizations, the prevailing
view seems to be that it should be so restricted."7 However, the United
States delegate was not sure of the propriety of excluding such organizations as, for example, the mixed government-private communications
satellite consortium.155
A final area of general agreement is that an international organization,
in order to become a party to the convention, must take some affirmative
action such as filing a declaration with the Secretary General. An international organization cannot be rendered liable as an entity merely because one or more members of the organization are also contracting parties
to the convention." 9 Substantial difference of opinion remains, however,
5

'Id. at 11-12.
55See statements of the British delegate, SR.52 at II; the Italian delegate, id. at 10; and the
Austrian delegate, id. at 7-8. The Austrian delegate cited the Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep.
174 stating that the United Nations, as an entity, may be considered liable in connection with
reparations for damages suffered in the service of the United Nations. This advisory opinion by the
Court is reproduced in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 589 (1949).
"o As the Chairman summarized, "The crucial issue was how to interpret the word 'and' in
the last sentence of item 5 of the Declaration; in other words, to determine whether or not the
Declaration placed primary responsibility on the international organizations." SR. 52 at 12.
"'See statements by the Austrian delegate, id. at 7, and the Italian delegate, id. at 10.
"I Id. at 12.
.ssSee statement of the Australian delegate, id. at 3.
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on the question raised but not answered in paragraph 5 of the Declaration: whether a claimant State should be required to look to the organization initially, and to its constituent member States only in the event of
default. The United States draft, in Article III, paragraph 3, requires a
claimant to look to the organization initially. The Hungarian draft, in
Article VII, provides that, "if liability for damage rests with an international organization, the financial obligations towards States suffering
damage shall be met by the international organization and by its member States jointly and severally." The Belgian draft leaves this question
open.
The supporters of the Hungarian version were fearful that, as a practical matter, enforcement against an international organization would be
difficult, particularly when the membership of the organization consists of
a large number of States not parties to the "liability" convention. ' On
the other hand, the argument was made that:
If international organizations were not allowed to accede to the convention
and to shoulder primary responsibility for compensating damages, smaller
States might hesitate to engage in research through the intermediary of
such organizations, and all would suffer. Such an approach might even have
the result of deterring States from ratifying the convention. '
The British delegate made the further argument that to impose primary
responsibility on the international organization would result in considerable procedural economy."'
It is obvious that the central difficulty posed by permitting international
organizations to become parties to the convention is the effect on member
States which, individually, do not ratify or accede to the convention.
Under the United States formula, subsidiary "liability" would be placed
only upon the "contracting parties" who are members of the organization.
States which are not contracting parties could not be held liable individually, although their contributions to the funds of the organization
could be reached. The U.S.S.R. delegate suggested a separate article requiring that States engaging in space activities within the framework of
an international organization assign responsibility both to the international
organization and to the States to be considered liable in the event of
damage. ' This suggestion is reminiscent of a provision of an earlier United
States draft which required an international organization to file a statement indicating how the amount of damages for which the organization
might be found liable would be apportioned among the constituent members.
As a practical matter, it is not likely that an international organization
would adhere to the convention unless most of its members were already
contracting parties. As for the remaining members, arrangements could
160See statements of the Rumanian delegate,

11-12.

161 SR.52 at 3.
62

1 Id. at 12.
3
16 Id. at 8.

SR.51 at 12, and the Soviet delegate, SR.48 at

The Italian delegate concurred, id. at 10.
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be made internally within the organization, if desired, to assure that such
States would suffer no loss. For example, States which are contracting
parties could agree to indemnify noncontracting States for any amount for
which the latter might be liable by reason of membership in an international organization held liable under the convention. The end result would
be the same as that suggested by the Soviet delegate. It would appear that
the objections of the Communist nations to the United States formula
could be largely satisfied if it were shown that international organizations
would not adhere to the convention unless most of the individual member
States were already contracting parties, and that any "liability" suffered
by noncontracting parties would be satisfactorily resolved through internal
arrangements.
e. Joint and Several Liability-Agreement had been reached in previous
sessions that the "liability" of the "launching States" involved in a joint
launching should be joint and several. This principle was expressed in
Article 3 of the Belgian draft; Article II, paragraph 3, of the United
States draft; and Article VI, paragraph 2, of the Hungarian draft. The
French delegate expressed some reservations as to placing all "launching
States" on an equal footing, citing the case of a State whose only involvement in a launch is that its territory is used to gain some astronautical
advantage."' The Rumanian delegate favored the idea of a priority listing
of States to be held liable, but did not think that any low priority should
be attached to a State whose territory is used for a launching." This
comment by the Rumanian delegate reveals the difficulties inherent in any
attempt to arrive at a priority listing of the multitude of differing involvements that might be present in a joint space venture. The idea was
not pressed in the Subcommittee.
The discussion which took place concerned the drafting of suitable
language to convey the meaning of joint and several liability. Article II,
paragraph 3, of the United States draft already contained one explanation.
The Australian delegate believed that the expression of the principle could
be made even clearer and consequently introduced the following amendment to the United States version:
If under this Convention, two or more launching States would be liable
to pay compensation, the Presenting State may proceed against any or all of
such States individually or jointly for the total amount of damages. Once
the amount of that liability is agreed upon or otherwise established, each
such State proceeded against shall be liable to pay that amount, subject,
however, to the condition that the amount recoverable by the Presenting
State from any Respondent State shall be reduced to the extent of any
compensation received in respect of that claim by the Presenting State from
any other Respondent State, to the intent that in no case shall the aggregate
of the compensation paid in respect of any one injury exceed the amount
which would be payable under this Convention if only one Respondent
State were liable."'
'4 SR.53

at 8.

l5Ibid.
'6'WG.II/30.

The text appears in SR.52 at 14.
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The Australian amendment purposely permits the claimant State to exercise the greatest flexibility possible in asserting its claim. It may proceed
against one, all, or any number of "launching States" either simultaneously
or in any order of its own choosing. The amendment also seeks to protect
the launching States by permitting the claimant State to recover only up to
the full amount of the damage. The matter of apportionment of the
"liability" is left to any internal arrangements which may be made by the
participants in the joint venture.
Only a few criticisms were made of the United States and Australian
formulations. The Rumanian delegate queried whether there was coverage
of a case where multiple incidents occurred (e.g., where a space object
causes damage in the air space of two different States and surface damage
in a third).1" The Canadian delegate felt that the United States and
Australian drafts already contemplated that a space object might cause
several kinds of damage in the course of the same flight.' The Belgian
delegate suggested that the use of the word "injury" in the Australian
draft was inappropriate since "injury" had been used previously as constituting only one kind of "damages." The Australian delegate agreed to
substitute either "damage" or "claim" for "injury.' '69 The Rumanian
delegate further suggested the addition of a subparagraph defining the
relations between co-debtor States where the claimant State claimed compensation from only one of the jointly and severally liable States.' The
United States delegate agreed to the extent that there might be included
a "safeguard clause to the effect that nothing in the convention would
prejudice the relationship established by prior agreement between corespondents"; or there might be included "a provision which would confer
on such prior agreement a certain official validity within the framework
of the convention itself."''
A debate ensued over the question of the "liability" of a non-member
international organization which has entered into a joint space venture
with a contracting party to the convention. The considerations involved
in coping with this situation are similar to those discussed previously in
connection with the "liability" of the constituent members of an organization which has incurred "liability" for damages. The Hungarian delegate argued that the "liability" of an international organization would
devolve on all its members and that the members of the organization would
be jointly and "separately" liable along with non-members who were
parties to the joint space venture.' The United Kingdom delegate rebutted that under the United States draft, if the organization failed to
meet its obligations, the claimant State could have recourse to the members
of the organization who are contracting parties to the convention." 3
167
168
09

'
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SR.$3 at 6.
Id. at 7.

Id. at 3.

Ibid.

at 7.
1 SR.54 at 4.
173 Id. at S.
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7 1 Id.
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As suggested by the United States delegate, the arguments made concerning joint and several liability where an international organization is
involved really pertain to the status of the organization as a party to the
convention and not to the status of the organization as a party to a joint
venture." ' However, one problem left unresolved by the United States and
Australian drafts was not touched upon in the discussions. If a claimant
State chooses to proceed solely against an international organization which
is a party to a joint space venture, and the organization defaults, should
the claimant be required to proceed against the other participants in the
joint venture before it proceeds against the constituent members of the
organization? The answer would appear to be in the affirmative, but the
drafts do not specifically resolve this question. This problem could, perhaps,
be more suitably covered in the provisions specifically concerned with the
status of international organizations. On the basis of the discussion in the
Fourth Session, there seems little reason why the Subcommittee cannot
agree upon the wording of an article governing joint and several liability.
f. Measure of Damages-Three different sets of problems were discussed which may be grouped under the general heading of how damages
should be measured under the convention. First, what law should be
applied to determine the measure of damages? Should it be an international
standard expressed in the convention itself? Or should it be the national
law of the launching State, or of the damaged State, or some other law
rendered applicable by virtue of a conflict of laws rule? Second, what
persons are covered under the convention-only nationals of the claimant
State suffering injury in that State, nationals and aliens, nationals of the
claimant State suffering injury abroad, resident aliens of the launching
State? Third, should the convention specifically exclude a particular kind
of damage (i.e., nuclear contamination) ?
1) The applicable law-There appears to be a polarization of views
on the question of whether an international standard or a designated national law should determine the measure of damages. Article II, paragraph
4, of the United States draft provides: "The compensation which a State
shall be liable to pay for damage under this convention shall be determined
in accordance with applicable principles of international law, justice and
equity." Article I of the Hungarian draft specifies that personal injury
and property damage are compensable under the treaty. Article II, paragraph 2, provides, in addition, that "loss of profits" and "moral damage"
are compensable "whenever compensation for such damage is provided for
by the law of the State liable for damage in general." Article 2 of the
Belgian draft defines "damage" to mean "any loss for which compensation
may be claimed under the law of the place where the loss is caused."
Damage incurred by a ship or aircraft and persons or property therein is
"deemed to have been caused in the territory of the flag State." Damage
caused to a space device and its contents is treated as having been caused
within the territory of the launching State. Thus the United States draft
4

17

Id. at 10.
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provides for an international standard. The Hungarian draft does not
state which law determines the amount of damages to be assessed for
personal injury or property damage. But the national law of the launching
State would determine whether moral damages or loss of profits are compensable. The Belgian draft is explicit in providing that the law of the
State in which the loss is caused governs."
The discussion which took place did not advance beyond the presentation of arguments in favor of applying an international standard or
applying one of the two national laws suggested. The Rumanian delegate
criticized the United States view on the ground that there was:
no international law in the field under consideration. There were no treaties;
the Subcommittee was drawing up the first one. There was no custom; there
had fortunately been no accidents so far. There were no generally recognized
rules of law that were applicable, as far as he knew. Thus, to invoke international law was simply to defer the whole question.

He preferred the adoption of the Belgian version-resort to the law of the
damaged State-in order that accidents resulting from space vehicles would
be treated like any other accidents occurring within the same country. He
opposed the Hungarian view for fear that if the law of the launching
State were used, launching States might adopt special legislative "rules"
exempting certain kinds of damage, when caused by space vehicles, from
being entitled to the compensation provided under general law.""
The United States delegate defended his view on the ground that under
the convention a claims commission would be established, and the fact
that the damage was caused by a space vehicle would not alter the nature
of the problem. Claims commissions have been settling claims for many
years on the basis of international precedent. 7 However, the French delegate rebutted that there is no fixed international compensation for a particular damage or injury, and only domestic law could settle such issues.'
The best argument on behalf of the United States position was made by
the Canadian delegate who argued that, if damages are to be assessed
according to the law of the country where the damage occurred, the
amounts of awards may vary considerably, particularly if States enact
special legislation on the subject. Although the United States version is
vague, it leaves room for the elaboration of uniform principles of international applicability.' The Soviet and Czech delegates supported the
Hungarian version without giving any particularly cogent reasons in
favor of the applicability of the law of the launching State over that of
the damaged State."'
It appears that any satisfactory resolution of this issue will require a
175 As pointed out by the French delegate, while the provision in the Belgian
as a definition, it was agreed that this definition would determine the law to be
mining the elements of damage. SR.54 at 7.
17' Id. at 11. The French delegate was in agreement, id. at 7.
.. Id. at 11. See also SR.48 at 45 in which the United States delegate listed
damage deemed compensable.
"I SR.54 at 12.
17 Id. at 8. The United Kingdom and Austrian delegates concurred, id. at 6,
110Id. at 9.

draft reads only
applied in deter-

various types of

8.
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compromise, probably taking the form of specifying a broad international
standard and requiring any claims commission to interpret that standard
utilizing the domestic law of the damaged State with respect to some kinds
of damage and, perhaps, the domestic law of the launching State for other
kinds of damage. Although the Austrian delegate suggested that the various kinds of damage might be listed in the convention, the Rumanian
delegate correctly pointed out that merely specifying certain kinds of
damage as compensable would not resolve the problem of what law should
be applied in measuring those damages.181 It is quite conceivable that there
will be agreement on a formula combining the general with the particular.
2) Persons covered-This topic includes the complex matter of determining whether injury or damage to aliens within the claimant State
should be covered, whether a State may claim on behalf of its nationals
suffering damage or injury abroad, and whether nationals of, and/or aliens
resident within a State held liable are entitled to claim under the convention. It is obvious that different States would express different views on
this subject. If the national law of the damaged and/or launching State
were to determine the answers to these questions in the context of particular situations, there would be a multitude of differing results, particularly if national conflict of laws rules were applied. Fortunately, as
noted in connection with previous sessions, efforts have been made to resolve these problems in the convention, although not in great detail.
Where the damage has occurred in the launching State, there is general
agreement that nationals of the launching State have resort only to local
law and not to the treaty.18 The same result would be obtained even where
such nationals incur damage abroad. This result is apparent from Article I
of the Belgian draft and Article V of the United States draft. However,
while permanent resident aliens of the launching State are excluded under
the Belgian draft, they are not excluded under the United States draft.
The French delegate argued that, contrary to the rule of affording diplomatic protection to aliens resident in a foreign State, permanent resident
aliens should receive the identical treatment as nationals. He therefore
favored the Belgian view.183 The Austrian delegate opposed the Belgian
view on the ground that aliens, even resident aliens, are entitled to the
protection of international law. Aliens resident in the launching State
should be protected from local laws denying compensation to persons residing therein. To exclude resident aliens of the launching State from
coverage might produce the anomalous result of an alien resident of the
launching State, who is also a national of a noncontracting State, recovering damages while other resident aliens, suffering the same damages, are
18
In addition, one might
barred from recovery under the convention.
question the equity of permitting resident aliens to recover under the
treaty but denying the same right to nationals. Indeed, the Mexican dele"I id. at 12-13.
182Statement of the Soviet delegate in SR.49 at 4.
a13
Id. at 9-10. The Soviet delegate concurred, id. at 4.
Id. at 8-9.
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gate believed this distinction, made in the United States draft, to be
anomalous."'
Turning to the status of citizens and residents of a State which is damaged and which is not a launching State, the Belgian draft in Article 2,
paragraph 5, and the United States draft, in Article IV, would permit the
damaged State to claim on behalf of its nationals and resident aliens. In
commenting upon the Belgian draft, the Swedish delegate thought that
it might be expanded to cover alien visitors."' However, the claim of a
visitor could be pressed by the State of which he is a national unless he
is a national of the launching State, in which case he would be barred entirely, at least under the Belgian and United States formulas. Under
Article VIII of the Hungarian draft, the language which presently appears
would permit a claimant State to prosecute claims on behalf of aliens who
are nationals of the launching State." 7
One could continue to discuss the possible combinations of rules necessary to cover nationals, aliens, and their damages wherever located. The
subject is one of the most complex raised in connection with the "liability"
convention.
3) Nuclear damage-The matter of covering damages caused by nuclear explosions, though not of decisive importance today, could become
considerably more important when interplanetary probes requiring the
use of nuclear rockets become prevalent. Three problems have been discussed concerning coverage of nuclear damage, one substantive and two
procedural. The latter two concern the time at which the statute of limitations begins to run and the period which must expire following an
accident, prior to the establishment of a claims commission. These two
problems have been discussed above in connection with the Third Session.
The debate in the Fourth Session arose over the third difficulty posed by
nuclear damage-that of measuring the damages caused by a nuclear
explosion. As noted above, Article I of the Hungarian draft had been
amended to exclude nuclear damage from the coverage of the convention."'
The other two drafts contained no such exclusion. The weight of opinion
in the Subcommittee seems to be in favor of covering all the questions
concerning nuclear damage in a separate article, if not in a separate convention. Consideration of nuclear damage in a separate article would permit a monetary limitation to be placed on "liability" for other kinds of
damage without accounting for the disproportionate effects of nuclear
contamination. Moreover, a separate article could cover injuries caused by
nuclear explosions which are not apparent until a considerable period of
time has elapsed since the accident."' 8 The United States delegate was
opposed to a separate treaty on nuclear damage. Even if a separate article
18'

88

SR.48 at 7-8.

' SR.54 at 10.
...SR.49 at 9.
188The United States and Italian delegates cited a possible inconsistency in Article I of the
Hungarian draft. The listing of "other impairment of health" as an element of compensable damages seemed to contemplate injuries resulting from nuclear radiation. SR.49 at 6.
s' Statements by the Austrian delegate, id. at 5, and the Argentine delegate, id. at 7.
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were adopted in the present convention, a suitable definition of "nuclear
damage" would be necessary. He posed the possible situation of a nuclear
reactor in use in a rocket falling to the earth and causing damage which
need not be considered "nuclear damage."'" At the suggestion of the
United States and U.S.S.R. delegates, the Subcommittee agreed to postpone further consideration of this matter pending inquiries made to the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for opinions as to the extent of damage that might result
from space vehicles containing reactors."'
4) Limitation of liability-Therewas general agreement that a monetary limitation should be imposed upon the "liability" which may be incurred with respect to each launching. Both Article IX of the United
States draft and Article II of the Hungarian draft constituted provisions
contemplating such a limitation. The Belgian draft did not contain a
similar provision, but the Belgian delegate stated that he would be amenable to specifying a ceiling.""2
Consideration of precisely what monetary limitation should be imposed
is,
of course, intertwined with settlement of the manner in which nuclear
damage should be treated under the convention. It was noted that there is
also a paucity of information concerning the extent to which damage,
in general, might be caused by space objects, and the suggestion was
made, but not adopted, that the whole matter of a suitable monetary
limitation should be turned over to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee for advice.' The United Kingdom delegate noted that the extent
of possible damage need not be the sole criterion for fixing a monetary
ceiling.'" As stated by the Mexican delegate, one of the reasons for fixing
a ceiling at all is to protect small countries which might suffer a financial
disaster if there were unlimited liability.'" This suggests that some formula
might be adopted based on ability to pay.
Another question that might be raised, as posed by the United Kingdom
delegate, is whether the ceiling imposed under the United States draft
would limit the "liability" only of each launching State involved in a
joint launching or of all launching States together. ' The Hungarian draft
is perhaps equally ambiguous in failing to specify whether the limitation
on "liability" is to be imposed with respect to each claim, on the one hand,
or each launching, on the other. Whether a monetary ceiling should be
imposed at all has been relatively simple compared with deciding what
that ceiling should be, or a formula for arriving at it. Resolution of this
problem will depend upon information received from the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee as to the possible extent of damages, and further,
110
Id.
191

at 3.

Id. at 7.

112 SR.55 at 3.

'"See statement of the Austrian delegate, id. at 4.
'94SR.$5 at 6. The Rumanian and Soviet delegates had expressed the same opinion, id. at 5.
5
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a decision by the Legal Subcommittee as to whether nuclear damages
should be included under such a ceiling.
During the Fourth Session, there was insufficient time to discuss the
various complex procedural problems under the "liability" convention
which had been raised in previous sessions. The United States delegate did
mention that the drafts introduced differed on the applicable procedure
for settlement of claims. In particular, he noted that the United States
and Belgian drafts provided for "an ultimate solution whereas the Hungarian draft made the settlement dependent upon the agreement of the
parties. ' Agreement on an article governing claims settlement, as well
as other procedural issues such as the statute of limitations, settlement of
disputes under the convention, the currency in which payment shall be
made, and the final clause problems of ratification, accession, and amendment must await future sessions. Despite the failure of the Subcommittee
to consider these procedural matters, the time available during this session
was well spent on narrowing the differences that existed on the substantive
issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

Looking back over the proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee during
the last four years, it would be fair to conclude that given the overall
context of the manner in which the Legal Subcommittee must operate,
significant progress has been made toward reaching agreement on rules
governing two of the most important present-day aspects of space activity.
Those who contend that the lawyers in the Subcommittee have been dilatory forget the limitations on the Subcommittee's work. First, the Sub-

committee is representative of the United Nations as a whole, both being
comprised of nations having differing legal, political, economic, and social
systems, and differing outlooks on problems and interests to protect even
in the most technical of areas. Second, the Subcommittee has only met for
a few weeks out of each year. And, in order to function at all, agreement
must be reached by a consensus, which means that there can be no strong
dissent from any action taken. Third, one must remember that rules of
law are being formulated. That progress in science and technology has far
outstripped the development of space law is not a sound argument, even
if the comparison is valid. The development of rules of law in general, and
particularly of international law, reveals that new steps are not taken
until there is a certain level of practice or agreement among the member
States involved. The areas of agreement achieved with respect to the "assistance and return" and "liability" conventions have almost entirely rested
on precedent taken from other areas of law. In other areas, such as compensation for nuclear damages, there are hardly enough facts available to
provide a basis for formulating a rule.
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the Subcommittee has made
197Id. at 6. See Article 4 of the Belgian draft, Article VII of the United States draft, and

Article XI of the Hungarian draft.
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significant contributions to the development of the law dealing with outer
space activities. While the first two sessions consisted largely of general
statements and political polemics directed, more or less, to the formulation
of a code of general principles, the discussions contributed substantially to
the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration of Legal Principles which may be viewed as evidence of the emergence of rules of
customary international law relating to outer space activities. The adoption of the Declarationwas important to the work of the Subcommittee
for it resolved for the time being the desire of some of the members to
draft such a code. The time available to future sessions could thus be
used in work more suited to lawyers than to politicians and philosophers
-the drafting of complex technical documents.
The work of the Third and Fourth Sessions has produced a number of
areas of agreement, or near agreement, on provisions of the "assistance
and return" and "liability" conventions. As noted above, agreement has
been reached on the Preamble and three articles of the "assistance and
return" convention, and, if international conditions are favorable, agreement on a final draft could be reached at the next session in which this
subject appears on the agenda. On the "liability" convention, " agreement
has almost been achieved on the wording of an article concerning joint
and several liability. Agreement does not appear distant on articles governing the definition of launching State, absolute liability and exoneration
therefrom, presentation of claims, and the status of international organizations. In the interim, if an emergency landing should take place, or if an
accident should occur, the rules which have been agreed upon thus far
in the Legal Subcommittee may serve as guidance to the actions of States,
if not as legal obligations in the form of a convention.
The law of outer space activities is becoming a reality; this paper has
attempted to indicate its process of crystallization.

"' For a comparison of the three drafts see Appendix II, infra.
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APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES: REVISED PROPOSAL
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 8/Rev. 2 (1964)

(The following is an amalgamation of the United States Proposal of 5 October

1964 and all of the United States amendments submitted during Part II of the
Third Session of the Legal Subcommittee.)
Convention Concerning Liability for Damage Caused
by the Launching of Objects into Outer Space
The Contracting Parties,
Recognizing that activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space
may on occasion result in damage,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space,"
Seeking to establish a uniform rule of liability and a simple and expeditious
procedure governing financial compensation for damage,
Believing that the establishment of such a procedure will contribute to the
growth of friendly relations and co-operation among nations,
Agree as follows:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Convention
(a) "Damage" means loss of life, personal injury, or destruction or loss of, or
damage to, property.
(b) The term "launching" shall include attempted launchings.
(c) "Launching State" means a Contracting Party, or international organization which has transmitted a notification to the Secretary-General under
Article III, paragraph 1, of this Convention, which launches or procures
the launching of an object into outer space or whose territory or facility
is used in such launching, or which exercises control over the orbit or
trajectory of an object.
(d) "Presenting State" means a State which is a Contracting Party, or international organization which has transmitted a notification to the SecretaryGeneral under Article III, paragraph 1 of this Convention, which presents
a claim for compensation to a Respondent State.
(e) "Respondent State" means a launching State, or international organization
which has transmitted a notification to the Secretary-General under Article
III, paragraph 1 of this Convention, from which compensation is sought
by a Presenting State.
Article 2
1. The launching State shall be absolutely liable and undertakes to pay compensation to the Presenting State, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, for damage on the earth, in air space, or in outer space, which is
caused by the launching of an object into outer space, regardless of whether such
damage occurs during launching, after the object has gone into orbit, or during
the process of re-entry, including damage caused by apparatus or equipment used
in such launching.
2. If the damage suffered results either wholly or partially from wilful or
reckless act or omission on the part of the Presenting State, or natural or juridical
persons it represents, the liability of the launching State to pay compensation
under section 1 of this Article shall, to that extent, be wholly or partially extinguished.
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3. If more than one State shall be liable to pay compensation for damage in
relation to any one incident under this Convention, each such State shall be
liable to pay the full amount of such compensation, provided that in no event
shall the aggregate of the compensation paid exceed the amount which would be
payable under this Convention if only one Respondent State were liable.
4. The compensation which a State shall be liable to pay for damage under
this Convention shall be determined in accordance with applicable principles of
international law, justice, and equity.
Article 3
1. If an international organization which conducts space activities transmits
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it accepts and
undertakes to comply with the provisions of the present Convention, all the provisions, except Articles X, XIII, XIV, and XV, shall apply to the organization
as they apply to a State which is a Contracting Party.
2. The declaration referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall contain a
statement as to the manner in which any liability incurred by the international
organization shall be borne by constituent members once the amount of compensation has been agreed upon or established pursuant to Article VII.
3. The Contracting Parties to the present Convention undertake to use their
best endeavours to ensure that any international organization which conducts
space activities and of which they are constituent members is authorized to make
and will make the declaration referred to in section 1 of this Article.
4. In the event that an international organization fails to pay within one year
of the date on which compensation has been agreed upon or established pursuant
to Article VII, each member of the organization which is a Contracting Party
shall, upon service of notice of such default by the Presenting State within three
months of such default, be liable for such compensation in the manner and to
the extent set forth in Article II, paragraph 3.
Article 4
1. A Contracting Party which suffers damage as a result of the launching of
an object into outer space, or whose natural or juridical persons suffer such damage, may present a claim for compensation to a Respondent State.
2. A Contracting Party may also present to a Respondent State a claim of
any natural person, other than a person having the nationality of the Respondent
State, permanently residing in its territory. However, a claim of any individual
claimant may be presented by only one Contracting Party.
3. A claim shall be presented through the diplomatic channel. A Contracting
Party may request another State to present its claim and otherwise represent its
interest in the event that it does not maintain diplomatic relations with the
Respondent State.
4. A claim must be presented within one year of the date on which the accident
occurred or, if the Presenting State could not reasonably be expected to have
known of the facts giving rise to the claim, within one year of the date on which
these facts became known.
Article $
A State shall not be liable under this Convention for damage suffered by its
own nationals.

Article 6
1. The presentation of a claim shall not require exhaustion of any remedies in
the Respondent State which might otherwise exist.
2. If, however, the Presenting State, or any natural or juridical person whom
it might represent, elects to pursue a claim in the administrative agencies or
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courts of the Respondent State or pursue other international remedies, it shall
not be entitled to pursue a claim under this Convention.
Article 7
1. If a claim is not settled within one year from the date documentation is
completed, the Presenting State may request the establishment of a commission
to decide the claim. In such event, the Respondent State and the Presenting State
shall each promptly appoint one person to serve on the commission, and a third
person, who shall act as chairman, shall be appointed by the President of the
International Court of Justice. If the Respondent State fails to appoint its member within three months, the individual appointed by the President of the Interational Court of Justice shall constitute the sole member of the commission.
2. No increase in the membership of the commission shall take place where there
is more than one Presenting State or Respondent State joined in any one proceeding before the commission. The Presenting States so joined may collectively
appoint one person to serve on the commission in the same manner and subject to
the same conditions as would be the case for a single Presenting State. Similarly,
where two or more Respondent States are so joined, they may collectively appoint
one person to serve on the commission in the same way.
3. The commission shall determine its own procedure.
4. The commission shall conduct its business and arrive at its decision by
majority vote.
5. The decision of the commission shall be rendered expeditiously and shall be
binding upon the parties.
6. The expenses incurred in connexion with any proceeding before the commission shall be divided equally between the parties in the proceeding.
Article 8
Payment of compensation shall be made in a currency convertible readily and
without loss of value into the currency of or used by the Presenting State.
Article 9
The liability of the launching State shall not exceed $
respect to each launching.

with

Article 10
Any dispute arising from, the interpretation or application of this Convention,
which is not previously settled by other peaceful means of their own choice, may
be referred by any Contracting Party thereto to the International Court of
Justice for decision.
Article 11
1. A Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Convention. An
amendment shall come into force for each Contracting Party accepting the amendment on acceptance by a majority of the Contracting Parties, and thereafter for
each remaining Contracting Party on acceptance by it.
2. After this Convention has been in force five years a revision conference may
be called upon the request of a majority of Contracting Parties.
Article 12
A Contracting Party may give notice of withdrawal from this Convention
five years after its entry into force by written notification to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from
the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. Such withdrawal
shall not relieve a State of any obligation or liability arising before withdrawal.
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Article 13
This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United
Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or Parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General
Assembly of the United Nations to become a party. Any such State which does
not sign this Convention may accede to it at any time.
Article 14
This Convention shall be subject to ratification or approval by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification or approval and instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 15
This Convention shall enter into force thirty days following the deposit of
the fifth instrument of ratification, approval or accession. It shall enter into force
as to a State ratifying, approving, or acceding thereafter upon deposit of its
instrument of ratification, approval, or accession.
Article 16
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred
to in Article XIII of signatures, deposits of instruments of ratification, approval,
or accession, declarations of acceptance by international organizations, the entry
into force of this Convention, proposals for amendments, notifications of acceptances of amendments, requests for the convening of a revision conference, and
notices of withdrawal.
Article 17
This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations who shall send certified copies to each of the States mentioned in
Article XIII.

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1966]

0-0
C4

0

~

...

-

-

-L
-

v-4
4V

4

-

-

4

*0

.-

00

'4

-;

o

w

0

~~~

C4~_

V

0 0.

0'
U

Z

44

0 "R~~*
-

-

n

0

~

~

1:4

ZH

o -

r

C)

4
:v.2J.

-

u

o<c

po

~ ~

w~~

Z 4b

-sz

H

z

P4

r

~

U

z
*

C~

~

0.
0-

4
bo0

-.4

0

P4

w E

-,,

.9
o-0-*

0;
z

cd

0

0->O

u~<

u

.0 . s0.

I

.0E

o

r
4

. 0
w

04

EQ

o

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

-0

*~-0

E

0

c 60

bo , ,
=

05

.

"

0

=-ru
-. Wo c

SE

~.

0

U

> u.

0

-0I

-'

o

-.

~~

u

o.' o

o"0.

0.&0

0

0~

0'- --

0

4

-0so.
boo

u

0U

U

.o

0,

*

o

~ Q~

.

~ ~ ~

-. 0

.Of
.

.

0

e'

o

0

.,

~0

.4tI

•

t0

.

z*Z

r

0~~..

4

to

0~0C

,

*.

at

~-o'

t

'

.

oo

E

•

E-C..a

E

"

,2r

"

C'

0 r0

,

bo

•'ouo.U
0
"

-

-

0.; 0u

.E , .- =E
o

.. zlo o,

.

x

~°

do

[Vol. 32

w

tix.

0

r

,,,.0
,

=M.0 u
01'.

*-.

U.0

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1966]
0
0
0
0

-

.0
0
0

00

.0N

0M
0-

0
0
.0
*0
ci.
4)4,

ci 0..

CO

to

I-

.0 0

-4

I

(3
0
.0

.

0.0
a

0

644-

"0

0>-.
0.0

.

~"0
~1.

2.00401
0
40~r

o' M
citoo

~4~0
*.~-004

S

Oci
ci"0

.0

0464

"0~
4),
~o0
>4,64

.0

0

"0

14

'4-4 ci

00
14

0

0

ci

00
144-

"0 0

4-N
.0

c-,..

. ,.

0"0

0

S
0

ci4,"0
4)4-0

'0.0o-

4,

civ

4,14
U,

to

2

to.
4-

too
EOv
ci

.2:2 ~
82

"0

''

oZ"0
0

,0.cc "-.

ci

8

0
cit
.0

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 32
SE

0"0O

4404-4t4
44 -t '4~ '4-'
4-too
-~

.- 0

fr'-

~

0 4-)

-~.'444

0-*~
0 -~
4- r

-.

~

'4~

50

~

0.0"

0

-cc
~

'4"

'4

--s~
g4
5 a

-c D~ 0

4-4
4-4
'4

4-

0
-u o.~0
00
~
44'4'40
>-0'40.7
~-0 o ~
4-4
00 a a '404
to
-~ -~ ~

a o

4)
4-4

S
-~
-

0

~

-~ '~' 0
44444-4~~~~

0

a

0

'4-

r

4z

0

4- ~4JQ~4
-- U---4) 04 44 '4
44'4
~44
o-'4'4
4-4 "44
-U2

-

0

w-~ ~

~44

''bo

-

.~

o-

~ to's

4.-44

& it

5~

0-0 0
0
~ '-a
0 4- 0

-~

a

1-'

'~

a

-

~ o

'4

~ -5 ~-0

to'4)0'

e440

~ 8-5 ~
~0
44

44

_toO

o

202

~ato
44
-o.

4-~ '4

4-

-~

0

t

'4;E

'4

-o

'4

'-'4~2
~
Sa~

-~

n5

O44f

-

2-s ~

'40
-~

'4 4-4(4~~
u~a~o

2~~'-

~

04-

.S.
I- ~
g ~ 04
-~

a44
~ 0'~
a~
a
4-4 04.0 44

• 0
0.10

o-

0

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1966]

to

u.,44)4
..
mv~)

o

0.

u

o20

04. >

U.

0

~~o2

be0

-

. 0-4I

4

2.0

-0

20

4

00
wo r

0

v

Eo '5-.-

o)

5.0.

o))4)-

0
o

o4

0 --

-

*

*

-.- o
0.))-5

40

4
bo
4 0
4).4)'.404'.

S.

.

~ 0o
.40..

0
40~~~

0ho

c:4S.

4

0

..

0

bo0

.

..

4

)

0

w.

9

4)

4

.1

-0

~*~.-. ~~0.
.0

-c.0E 0

404
04)

0

4O

T.

0

r.

.))40

-u

.004)

w.4'

0

0)

4~4

bou

4 4 4

~44.4
fi4S.
..

.04

a

4)4.

4

0o.

.~.)
00

4)'

boo

0&=~

0

0

0j

r

0

4).0

0

00

E

)

K).4

60) 0
0.
r

wo 01

0

0~ 0

00

0

00..
z~~~
00

80-o

J

0

.oo

[Vol. 32

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

0" 0

20

0

.a

0
o).
4
00
0"

t

"

-2

*..0.0

.

,

0,
"

E.o La
oO
'- 60

c
.Eo.3

..

.

0 .0'

0

.~ 0

.

,, C(,°

0 E ,,

-

.

4)

4 )

b0

w

0

"

.. ,. c.,u

0

<

..
.

,

v
,'t

i2

u '4) E' r

'
r

'

o

0

'

i2

C4
,
0'
o')E t * E

4)

.

47,

r. .
k

..

t-

04-)

ow

O

-

0

0-0

-ft

•

u

X

t.z

C.
o

.

00

" -

o '

<>

c

*z

_3 >i

'

0
4

(

0

00

0

0=

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1966]
*

o

.J.~

aa

0.

.a2~a
t~
.40

Z1

0.4
C
0.4.-fl
~
.4(fl .t~
-~

b-.

4

4-4 ')

~

'4

0

4-

5a~2
~ 04.2
~ .2'
c0

.4c

0
a
ci

ci~,

-a .4.~

Cud
ci "-a

-a

')

I-4~

--

~u

2

u.

u~

...

.4

.C .0

4-4-~-ci

3o
U')
2a

0

a.4.40
a

0

.....

a

0

uu
ci

ci

2at
ciC.

.40.0

0.

*

.a

'-

-~

W.4

-

44.44
~-'fl

2

4-

~0.4

act'-'-

tE

0

U
0

X

.4
0'~-4
'44 0

"c i

cid
*4- 0
.~ -~

~

-~

1*- ~u

[Vol. 32

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

"0

~'0
c~

4

0)
0

0o

004

cak0

044'-

0-~ E~0

V-0.0

c:2
0

r
4044)

1)

040

to.

0

0

~

-

-

..

0 U.-0-

-00-444

t%

&-

"

I

r

40A2
).

9-0

4)4

LI

0

i.-0
0

bo

00244

*

-

)

.0
00

44

0

a

-. ,
00
144

0

.

4'O

0

100-4)

-00

>,(A..

-

-z

~ ~o~2.222'5~Z
o

'4'.40-

0
r

E

*.4*00
ux.44

0. >4U )4)-5

0r

0
4

o

.0-

LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1966]

ol

.Oo

1

ol

0 ..

N

.o

.0

0

4.

OU 4r

U.
4)*04

n~*

"4 .

*'

0

44.

U150

0

0

u ue

o
U

0

c

0

4)

-0"O5 0

U0w

3o

)u

U

00

,z000
0

., 4)04

0

..

.

00")
4.404)

0

-..U

2.

4-

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 32

-zU-

00O

*4*.

0

0

-0

o~

-

'0

0

Ix

0

mr

rE

U
g

,.0~0
-a
00

0

-

u

c.n~S
S..-.-~

US

O.
0

o-

E

..

oUO

v.b

0
0

o

00

w-

.0

0,-~E~

.

00-00kU

~

r, o'

o

oa

.

0

0 .

-0 0

44

U

0

U

E. up0

Um

a0

0~

bb.

uo

'"~0
S.U

U

O'a

0.

Ca

-a

u r

.00
N.

Ct0 tor0

0 >*

V,

. "

0

o

o

O.S

'

.4

-u-c

00

> r

o' u
00

S.

c.0

r

90.,

ZS.bt'
Ca.UU

S.
Q.

0

~

-

r

C.

.§

.

~

C

0O

0

~~Ca0
-c

>C=a

.CH

Ca Ca

o*Pt

-0

g.

a0-0~a/

0

Pa

0.

S

r

-0S u0

USU~
.m

US.

U0

r-oc

.0

C

rSS

